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Job Security Without Equality: The Family and 
Medical Leave Act of 1993 
Joanna L. Grossman∗ 
Mr. Murphy. I say to be careful. You know some of us guys 
really don’t want this protection. We might have to stay home 
and take care of the kids. [Laughter.] 
Mrs. Schroeder. There is an honest man.1 
Eight years after it first considered a bill to require employers to 
provide parental leave to their employees,2 Congress enacted the 
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA),3 a withered version 
 ∗ Associate Professor, Hofstra Law School. B.A., Amherst College; J.D., Stanford Law 
School. I am extremely grateful to Susann Duffy, Susan Hinde, and Jennifer Sharf, all of whom 
managed to provide valuable research assistance despite many competing demands on their 
time.  
 1. Parental and Disability Leave: Joint Hearing on H.R. 2020 Before the Subcomm. on 
Civil Serv. and the Subcomm. on Comp. and Employee Benefits of the House Comm. on Post 
Office and Civil Serv. and the Subcomm. on Labor Mgmt. Relations and the Subcomm. on 
Labor Standards of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 99th Cong. 16 (1985) (statements of 
Rep. Murphy and Rep. Schroeder) (quoted in RONALD D. ELVING, CONFLICT AND 
COMPROMISE: HOW CONGRESS MAKES THE LAW 49 (1995)). 
 2. The first federal parental leave bill was introduced by Representative Patricia 
Schroeder in 1985. See Parental and Disability Leave Act of 1985, H.R. 2020, 99th Cong., 131 
CONG. REC. 8318 (1985) (presenting the bill); see also ELVING, supra note 1, at 18–42 
(describing the work of activists and legislators leading up to the introduction of H.R. 2020); 
Emily A. Hayes, Note, Bridging the Gap Between Work and Family: Accomplishing the Goals 
of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1507, 1517 (2001) 
(describing the original bill and the impetus for its introduction). 
 3. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-03, 107 Stat. 6 (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2612–2654 (2000)). A version of the FMLA was introduced in every 
Congress between 1985 and 1993. See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, S. 5, 103d 
Cong. (1993); Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, H.R. 1, 103d Cong. (1993); Family and 
Medical Leave Act of 1991, S. 5, 102d Cong. (1991); Family and Medical Leave Act of 1991, 
H.R. 2, 102d Cong. (1991); Family and Medical Leave Act of 1990, S. 2973, 101st Cong. 
(1990); Family and Medical Leave Act of 1989, S. 345, 101st Cong. (1989); Family and 
Medical Leave Act of 1989, H.R. 770, 101st Cong. (1989); Parental and Medical Leave Act of 
1988, S. 2488, 100th Cong. (1988); Parental and Medical Leave Act of 1987, S. 249, 100th 
Cong. (1987); Family and Medical Leave Act of 1987, H.R. 925, 100th Cong. (1987); Parental 
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of its earliest predecessor. At its core, the FMLA requires employers 
to give employees a limited amount of unpaid leave when necessary 
to accommodate personal illness or family caregiving responsibilities. 
When it enacted this legislation, Congress purportedly had a 
vision: Employers would offer caretaking leave to men and women 
on equal terms, men and women would take leave and share the 
burden of caring for children, employers would perceive male and 
female employees as equally (un)attractive, and women would 
achieve equality both as parents and as workers. At least that’s the 
vision attributed to Congress by the Supreme Court last term when it 
considered the constitutional validity of applying the Family and 
Medical Leave Act of 1993 to the states in Nevada Department of 
Human Resources v. Hibbs.4 
This vision, however, is complicated by the assumption that men 
would, if they could, take unpaid leave from their jobs in order to 
help care for their children or other family members. There was 
virtually no basis for making that assumption in 1993, when 
Congress passed the bill that would ultimately become law, and not 
much greater of one today.5 Indeed, the advocates and congressional 
proponents of a federal leave law recognized that any such law would 
function primarily to provide job security for working mothers. 
If men do not take caretaking leave, the nature of women’s 
equality that might be captured through the FMLA is quite different 
than that envisioned by the Supreme Court. If only mothers take 
leave, then the FMLA only accommodates women’s caretaking, 
protection that gives them a measure of job security but at the same 
time preserves employers’ incentive to prefer male employees. It also 
does nothing to equalize the burdens of caretaking themselves. The 
FMLA thus promotes motherhood without promoting equal 
parenthood and promotes mothers’ working without promoting 
equality for working women. The FMLA’s failure to account for the 
and Medical Leave Act of 1986, S. 2278, 99th Cong. (1986); Parental and Medical Leave Act 
of 1986, H.R. 4300, 99th Cong. (1986); Parental and Disability Leave Act of 1985, H.R. 2020, 
99th Cong. (1985). Leave legislation passed both houses of Congress twice, but both times 
President George H.W. Bush vetoed it. See Hayes, supra note 1, at 1516. 
 4. 538 U.S. 721, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003). 
 5. See infra text accompanying notes 99–103, 229–36 (describing available empirical 
data on leave-taking patterns by men).  
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fact that men do not tend to take time away from work for parenting 
or other caretaking tasks precludes it from making a meaningful 
contribution to gender equality. Thus, on the tenth anniversary of the 
FMLA, we have only limited cause for celebrating a statute whose 
contribution to women’s true equality has been largely symbolic.  
This essay reevaluates the passage and implementation of the 
FMLA against the egalitarian ideal described by the Supreme Court 
in Hibbs. Part I examines the Hibbs opinion, the Court’s conclusion 
that states can be sued for money damages in federal court for 
violating the family care provisions of the FMLA, and the vision of 
the Act’s contribution to equality that dictated that holding. Part II 
examines the data available to both legislators and advocates during 
the process of constructing and enacting family leave legislation, with 
a particular focus on existing knowledge about patterns of paternal 
leave-taking. Part III begins the process of reevaluation, looking first 
at the legislative history of the FMLA and the advocacy that led to its 
original and repeated introductions into both houses of Congress. 
This part identifies a central assumption, shared by both opponents 
and proponents of the final Act and its predecessor bills, that 
federally mandated leave would primarily accommodate the leave-
taking needs of mothers. Part IV examines the FMLA’s impact on 
leave policies and leave-taking, noting the replication of prior 
gendered, leave-taking patterns. Finally, Part V launches a critique of 
the FMLA from the standpoint of anti-subordination theory. Through 
that lens, the FMLA’s ability to enhance equality for women seems 
quite constrained. 
I. THE SUPREME COURT’S VISION OF THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL 
LEAVE ACT 
The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 gives certain 
employees the right to twelve weeks of unpaid leave per year if 
needed to care for a newborn or newly adopted child, to care for a 
seriously ill family member, or to attend to one’s own serious health 
condition.6 To be eligible, an employee must have worked at least 
 6. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1), (c) (2000); 29 C.F.R. § 825.100(a) (2003). 
Comprehensive data on coverage and implementation of the FMLA is available in reports 
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1,250 hours in the previous year7 for an employer who employs at 
least fifty workers within a seventy-five-mile radius of where the 
employee requesting leave reports to work.8  
Because the leave is unpaid, the FMLA protects three basic rights: 
the right to be restored into the same position following the period of 
leave,9 the right to the continuation of benefits throughout the leave,10 
and the right to not be penalized for taking an authorized leave.11 
Denial of leave under the FMLA and retaliation for taking leave can 
be enforced through private suits12 or suits by the U.S. Department of 
Labor brought on an employee’s behalf.13 Compensatory damages, as 
well as an assortment of equitable remedies, are available to 
successful plaintiffs.14 
Though these rights are related, courts have analyzed claims under 
commissioned by the Department of Labor in 1995 and 2000. The 2000 report consists of two 
telephone surveys: the 2000 Survey of Employees, a telephone survey with 2,558 completed 
interviews, and the 2000 Survey of Establishments, a telephone survey with 1,830 completed 
interviews. The employee survey includes both public- and private-sector employees, while the 
establishment survey includes only private-sector employers. According to the 2000 survey, 
58.3% of all employees in the U.S. labor force work for establishments covered by the FMLA, 
though only 10.8% of private employers are covered. See DAVID CANTOR ET AL., DEP’T OF 
LABOR, BALANCING THE NEEDS OF FAMILIES AND EMPLOYERS: FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE 
SURVEYS 2000 UPDATE 3-2 to 3-3 (2000) [hereinafter FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE SURVEYS 
2000].  
 7. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A)(ii) (2000) (defining “eligible employee”); 29 C.F.R. 
§ 825.110(a)(2) (2003). Only 61.7% of employees are both eligible and in the employ of a 
covered establishment. See FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE SURVEYS 2000, supra note 6, at A-2-
21 tbl.A2-3.1. 
 8. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(i) (2000) (defining “employer”); see also id. 
§ 2611(2)(B)(ii) (2000) (defining those employees excluded from coverage); 29 C.F.R. 
§ 825.110(a)(3) (2003). 
 9. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611(2)(B)(iii), 2614(a)(1)(A) (2000); 29 C.F.R. § 825.214(a) 
(2003). 
 10. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2614(a)(2), 2614(c)(1) (2000); 29 C.F.R. § 825.209 (2003). 
 11. See 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) (2000) (making it “unlawful for any employer to interfere 
with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided”); 
§ 2615(a)(2) (making it “unlawful for any employer to discharge or in any other manner 
discriminate against any individual for opposing any practice made unlawful by this 
subchapter”). 
 12. See 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2) (2000); 29 C.F.R. § 825.400(a)(2) (2003). 
 13. See 29 U.S.C. § 2617(b) (2000); 29 C.F.R. § 825.400(a)(1) (2003). 
 14. Potential remedies include compensatory damages for lost wages, benefits, and other 
monetary losses, as well as equitable relief and attorneys’ fees and costs. See 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 2617(a)(1), 2617(a)(3) (2000); 29 C.F.R. § 825.400(c) (2003). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol15/iss1/3
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each differently.15 Section 2614 of the FMLA guarantees the right to 
return to the same job following a leave as long as the leave was 
authorized by statute and the employer would not otherwise have 
discharged the employee or eliminated her job if she had not taken 
the leave.16 Retaliation claims generally proceed under the same 
rubric as a Title VII disparate treatment claim.17  
Legally speaking, the FMLA has been relatively uninteresting. 
Most cases have raised technical questions, easily resolved by 
courts.18 The only significant test for the FMLA has been a series of 
Eleventh Amendment challenges to the application of the statute’s 
various provisions to state employers.19  
The Supreme Court raised the profile of the FMLA by agreeing to 
hear one such case last term, a challenge by the State of Nevada to 
the constitutionality of allowing William Hibbs to sue the State of 
Nevada for damages in federal court for its alleged violation of the 
family care provision of the FMLA.20 Ultimately rejecting Nevada’s 
challenge,21 the Supreme Court endorsed an inspiring interpretation 
of the FMLA as an Act was conceived and implemented in order to 
promote equality for women. The question for the Court in Hibbs was 
whether state governments can be taken to task for their failure to 
honor rights given by the FMLA when dealing with their own 
 15. Courts often characterize the right to take leave as a “prescriptive” protection of the 
FMLA and the right not to be retaliated against for taking leave as a “proscriptive” protection. 
See, e.g., Thomas v. Pearle Vision, Inc., 251 F.3d 1132, 1139 (7th Cir. 2001).  
 16. See, e.g., Kohls v. Beverly Enters. Wis., Inc., 259 F.3d 799, 806–07 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(rejecting plaintiff’s FMLA claim where there was insufficient evidence to disprove employer’s 
claim that she would have been terminated regardless of her leave). 
 17. See, e.g., Weston-Smith v. Cooley Dickinson Hosp., Inc., 282 F.3d 60, 64 n.2 (1st Cir. 
2002). 
 18. See, e.g., Stout v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 282 F.3d 856, 858 n.1 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(noting the inapplicability of the FMLA to a plaintiff who had been employed by the defendant-
employer for less than twelve months); Rowe v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 244 F.3d 1115, 1118 
(9th Cir. 2001) (allowing employer to count undesignated leave against employee’s twelve-
week allotment); Harris v. Union Pac. R.R., 141 F.3d 740 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding that the 
FMLA is not implicated by plaintiffs’ claim that they should get severance benefits for 
company-wide layoffs that took place during leave period). 
 19. See, e.g., Chittister v. Dep’t of Cmty. & Econ. Dev., 226 F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(personal illness provision); Kazmier v. Widmann, 225 F.3d 519 (5th Cir. 2000) (personal 
illness and family care provisions). 
 20. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1977 (2003). 
 21. See id.  
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employees. The challenge was practically significant for the many 
employees eligible for FMLA protections who work for state 
employers.22  
Plaintiff William Hibbs was an employee in the Welfare Division 
of the Nevada Department of Human Resources, a unit of Nevada’s 
state government.23 He sought unpaid leave from his job to care for 
his ailing wife.24 Nevada granted him the leave under both the FMLA 
and a “catastrophic leave” policy, but later fired him anyway.25 Hibbs 
sued under the FMLA, but Nevada argued for dismissal on the 
grounds that the sovereign immunity provided by the Eleventh 
Amendment precluded Hibbs’s action. The trial court agreed with 
Nevada, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
reversed.26 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case because the 
Ninth Circuit’s conclusion was at odds with several other federal 
appellate cases raising Eleventh Amendment challenges to FMLA 
enforcement,27 one of which had involved the same family care 
provision at issue in Hibbs.28 
The Eleventh Amendment provides nonconsenting states (and 
state agencies) with immunity from suits for money damages brought 
in federal court.29 Such suits can be brought only if a state voluntarily 
waives immunity or if Congress abrogates states’ immunity.30 
 22. Unfortunately, the available surveys on FMLA coverage do not differentiate between 
public- and private-sector employees, though both are covered by the Act. Although estimates 
of the number of private-sector employees who are covered exist, there is no data from which to 
make parallel estimates for public-sector employees. See FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE 
SURVEYS 2000, supra note 6, at 3-2. However, data from the Employee Benefits Survey, 
conducted in 1997 by the Department of Labor and Statistics, revealed that of those surveyed, 
ninety-three percent of public sector employees were covered by unpaid family leave policies, 
whether or not they were required by state or federal law. Current Labor Statistics, MONTHLY 
LABOR REVIEW 39, 76 (July 2003).  
 23. See Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1976. 
 24. Id. 
 25. The parties disputed, among other points, whether the two kinds of leave should be 
concurrent or consecutive. See Hibbs v. Dep’t of Human Resources, 273 F.3d 844, 848–49 (9th 
Cir. 2001), aff’d, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003). 
 26. Id. at 873. 
 27. See, e.g., Sims v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 219 F.3d 559, 566 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding that 
Congress had not validly abrogated states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to 
enforcement of the personal illness leave provision). 
 28. Kazmier v. Widmann, 225 F.3d 519, 526, 529 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 29. See Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1976. 
 30. See id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol15/iss1/3
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To validly abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity, 
Congress must first unequivocally express its intent to do so.31 
Congress clearly expressed such intent in the FMLA, authorizing 
suits against any “public agency” in federal or state court, and 
defining “public agency” to include state governments and their 
subdivisions.32  
Second, Congress must act pursuant to a valid exercise of power. 
The Court’s precedents make clear that Congress may only validly 
abrogate state immunity when it acts pursuant to Section Five of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.33 When it enacted the FMLA, Congress 
relied both on the Commerce Clause, which does not empower it to 
abrogate states’ immunity, and on its Section Five power when it 
enacted the FMLA.34 The issue for the Court in Hibbs, then, was 
whether Congress acted within its Section Five power when it 
enacted the family leave provisions of the Statute.35  
Section Five gives Congress the “power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions” of the Fourteenth Amendment that 
guarantee, among other things, equal protection under the laws. Thus, 
Section Five has been the source of a number of anti-discrimination 
statutes.36 It clearly permits Congress to prohibit unconstitutional 
behavior by the states.37 But Congress clearly went beyond this 
standard with the FMLA, since employees have no substantive 
constitutional right to mandatory leave—certainly not one that 
 31. See id. 
 32. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(x), 2611(4)(A)(iii), 2617(a)(2) (2000). 
 33. See Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1976; see also Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 
531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001); Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 786–89 (1991) 
(citing Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 228 (1989)). 
 34. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601(b)(4)–(5) (2000); see also S. REP. NO. 103–3, at 16 (1993) 
(stating the FMLA “is based not only on the Commerce Clause, but also on the guarantees of 
equal protection and due process embodied in the 14th Amendment”); H.R. REP. NO. 103-08, 
pt. 1, at 29 (1993) (same). 
 35. Technically, only the family-care provision Hibbs tried to invoke was at issue before 
the Court. A challenge to the parenting provision would almost certainly come out the same 
way, though a challenge to the employee sick-leave provision might not. See, e.g., Brockman v. 
Wyoming Dep’t of Family Servs., 342 F.3d 1159, 1163–66 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that the 
Hibbs decision does not apply to the FMLA provision regarding personal sick leave, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 2612(a)(1)(D), because the legislative history of the Act did not address gender-based 
discrimination by state employers against individuals requiring time off for personal illness).  
 36. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
 37. See Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1976–77. 
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dictates the precise terms for leave mandated by the Statute. 
However, Section Five gives Congress greater power than simply 
proscribing unconstitutional conduct.38 The Supreme Court has 
interpreted it to allow Congress to proscribe constitutional conduct as 
well, if necessary to deter unconstitutional conduct.39  
To validly reach facially constitutional behavior, Congress must 
act based on a history of constitutional violations and design a 
remedy that is both proportional and congruent to the identified 
injury.40 Thus, the crucial questions in Hibbs were whether Congress 
enacted the FMLA in response to a history of state-sponsored gender 
discrimination and, if so, whether the Act was an appropriate 
response to that history. The Court found both prongs of this test to 
be met and ultimately upheld Hibbs’s right to sue his employer for its 
alleged violation of the FMLA.  
The Court’s inquiry into the validity of Congress’s action begins 
with the observation that the “FMLA aims to protect the right to be 
free from gender-based discrimination in the workplace.”41 This is a 
valid statutory purpose, according to Eleventh Amendment 
jurisprudence, only if it is formed in response to a “pattern of 
constitutional violations on the part of the States in this area.”42 
The history of state-sponsored discrimination against women in 
the workplace is well-established. For the better part of the twentieth 
century, states enacted and maintained laws designed to minimize 
their ability to work outside the home or participate in public life and 
to maximize their obligations as mothers. Illinois refused to permit 
women to act as lawyers.43 Michigan refused to allow women to tend 
bar.44 Oregon limited the number of hours women could do wage-
earning work in certain environments.45 Florida encouraged women 
to avoid jury service.46  
 38. See id. at 1977. 
 39. See id. 
 40. See id. 
 41. Id. at 1978. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872). 
 44. See Goesaert v. Clearly, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). 
 45. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).  
 46. See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961).  
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The cases in which each of these practices was unsuccessfully 
challenged in the Supreme Court are legendary for their broad and 
sweeping pronouncements about the importance of preserving 
women’s reproductive capacity, encouraging their exclusive devotion 
to raising children and other domestic pursuits,47 and reinforcing their 
unfitness for many forms of paid employment. 
With hindsight, however, these cases seem shocking. And 
measured against the standards of modern equal protection cases, 
each of these practices would fail to pass constitutional muster. Thus, 
in Hibbs, they form the backbone of the claim that women have 
suffered a history of constitutionally injurious employment 
discrimination.48 
It was to this history that Congress responded when it enacted 
Title VII in 1964—another statute for which Congress successfully 
abrogated the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity.49 But, the 
Supreme Court noted in Hibbs, “state gender discrimination did not 
cease.”50 It persevered, among other ways, when states continued “to 
rely on invalid gender stereotypes in the employment context, 
specifically in the administration of leave benefits.”51  
The record before Congress showed that states, like private sector 
employers, tended to utilize policies that created and perpetuated a 
society in which women were largely responsible for family 
caretaking either because leave was only available to women or 
because no leave was available.52  
The Court also noted Congress’s reliance on a Bureau of Labor 
Statistics survey showing that while thirty-seven percent of private-
 47. Justice Bradley’s concurrence in Bradwell is, of course, the most quotable (and 
quoted) on this point, as he invoked the “law of the Creator” to justify excluding women from 
the legal profession. Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring). 
 48. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532–33 (1996) (holding that to analyze 
gender-based classifications, the “reviewing court must determine whether the proffered 
justification is ‘exceedingly persuasive,’” a burden that “is demanding and [] rests entirely on 
the State”). 
 49. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976); see also Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1978. 
 50. 123 S. Ct. at 1978. 
 51. Id. at 1979. 
 52. See id. at 1979 n.3 (discussing the results of a fifty-state survey presented at The 
Parental and Medical Leave Act of 1986: Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on Labor-
Management Relations and the Subcommittee on Labor Standards of the House Committee on 
Education and Labor, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 33 (1986)). 
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sector employees had access to maternity leave, only eighteen percent 
had access to paternity leave.53 A fifty-state survey available to 
Congress demonstrated that public-sector employees had access to 
maternity and paternity leave in proportions similar to those in the 
private sector.54  
Several states, according to data before Congress, explicitly 
offered leave only for women that far exceeded any period of 
physical disability.55 According to the Court, fifteen states gave 
women up to one year of maternity leave without providing men any 
comparable leave.56 Beyond the first six weeks, this leave is clearly 
for parenting rather than delivering a child, and yet only women were 
given the opportunity to do it. This pattern, the Court concluded, 
indicates that “stereotype-based beliefs about the allocation of family 
duties remained firmly rooted, and employers’ reliance on them in 
establishing discriminatory leave policies remained widespread.”57  
The Court also took into account pervasive, discriminatory 
implementation of facially neutral leave policies.58 Evidence before 
Congress showed that male employees received discriminatory 
treatment when they requested supposedly available paternity leave, 
and to the extent leave was left to the discretion of supervisors, that 
pattern of discrimination was exacerbated.59 
The Court in Hibbs noted the practical effect of these 
discriminatory leave policies. Leave policies that either formally 
allow or in fact result in the allowance of maternity leave, but not 
paternity leave, further the same core stereotype that kept nineteenth-
century women out of the legal profession and twentieth-century 
women out of demanding jobs and jury pools: “women’s family 
 53. Id. at 1979. These numbers are somewhat misleading because the thirty-seven percent 
does not differentiate between leave available for childbirth and leave available for 
mothering—both of which are included in the general term “maternity.” To the extent the 
policies provided only for childbirth leave, it is not at all surprising—nor reflective of gender 
stereotypes—that men did not have access to the same leave. 
 54. See id. at 1979 n.3. 
 55. See id.  
 56. See id. 
 57. Id. at 1979. 
 58. See id. at 1980.  
 59. See id.  
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duties trump those of the workplace.”60 Disparate leave policies, to 
the extent they do not correspond with any actual disability from 
childbirth, assume women will take on parenting responsibilities and, 
commensurately, that men will not.61 This assumption then reinforces 
the role of women as primary caretakers and discourages men’s 
participation in caregiving activities, even when they have an 
affirmative desire to take them on.  
Facially neutral policies can have the same stereotyping and habit-
reinforcing effects as discriminatory ones. An employer who offers 
no leave makes it almost impossible for women to continue working 
while having children because almost all women require some time 
off for childbirth and at least some need medically necessary leave 
during pregnancy as well. If women take time off for these reasons—
and do not have job protection—the no-leave policy has the effect of 
reinforcing the pattern of women as primary caregivers beyond the 
usual period of disability.62 Even for women who are capable of 
returning to work immediately, someone needs to care for the 
newborn child, and a variety of social and economic pressures 
influence a couple’s decision in favor of the mother’s filling that 
role.63  
The disparate leave-taking patterns affect women’s status not only 
as parents, but also as workers. In the case of women-only leave 
policies or gender-neutral, no-leave policies, women become less 
attractive to employers because they are likely to cost more in terms 
of time off, lost productivity, and replacement workers, as well as 
make quicker exits from the workforce. Men, whether they are 
predisposed to or not, are unlikely to take time off from work to 
fulfill parenting obligations.  
These “mutually reinforcing stereotypes,” the Hibbs Court noted, 
“created a self-fulfilling cycle of discrimination that forced women to 
continue to assume the role of primary family caregiver, and fostered 
 60. Id. at 1979. 
 61. See id. at 1979 n.5 (noting that it is common for collective bargaining agreements to 
grant “maternity” leave for six months to a year—to women only). 
 62. See id. at 1982–83. 
 63. See generally Naomi Cahn, The Power of Caretaking, 12 YALE J.L. FEMINISM 177, 
185 (2000) (noting that the “penalties attendant to parental leave that fathers fear are both 
concrete and intangible”); see also infra text accompanying notes 104–14. 
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employers’ stereotypical views about women’s commitment to work 
and their value as employees.”64 Because the cycle was at least in part 
state sponsored or created, the “pervasive sex-role stereotype that 
caring for family members is women’s work”65 justified a 
Congressional remedy.66  
The Court also found that the FMLA directly combats gender 
discrimination—a second, necessary component of its Eleventh 
Amendment analysis.67 Two characteristics of the FMLA were 
important to the Court’s conclusion that the Act is both “congruent 
and proportional to the targeted violation”:68 that employers are 
required to offer leave at all and that the Act makes leave available 
on a gender-neutral basis.69  
By insisting that employers make leave available (which no other 
federal statute requires70), the FMLA improves the chances that 
women who in fact perform the majority of caregiving work—both 
for children and other family members—can continue wage-earning 
despite these responsibilities. A law that insists on gender equality in 
the provision of leave, but does not set a minimum amount of leave, 
would “exclude far more women than men from the workplace,”71 
since they would be more likely to opt out of the workforce due to 
caregiving needs. 
By equalizing the availability of leave for both sexes, the Court 
observed, the FMLA encourages men to share in parenting and 
caregiving obligations.72 That inducement “attacks the formerly state-
 64. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1982. 
 65. Id. at 1979. 
 66. See id. at 1982. 
 67. See id. 
 68. Id. (quoting Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001)). The Court’s recent 
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence established this standard for evaluating the validity of 
Section Five legislation. One effect of Hibbs, unrelated to its impact on leave policies, is that it 
reinforces this newly minted standard. Whether this is the correct standard for Section Five 
analysis or an appropriate application of the standard is beyond the scope of this Article. For 
recent commentary on these questions, see generally Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, 
Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family 
and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943 (2003). 
 69. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1982. 
 70. See infra text accompanying notes 142–47, 240–50 (discussing the protections given 
by Title VII, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act). 
 71. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1983. 
 72. Id. at 1982. 
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sanctioned stereotype that only women are responsible for family 
caregiving.”73 It targets the “fault line between work and family,” the 
Court explained, where “sex-based overgeneralization has been and 
remains strongest.”74 Congress, the Court concluded, sought to 
remove the stigma borne by female employees as the predominant 
leave-takers and reduce “employers’ incentives to engage in 
discrimination by basing hiring and promotion decisions on 
stereotypes.”75  
The Supreme Court’s vision is thus inspiring, not only because it 
perceives the workplace inequality that results from the 
discriminatory allocation of parenting leave to women but not men, 
but more importantly because it acknowledges the broader equality 
interest in reallocating the underlying caregiving burdens. Were this 
vision to come to pass, there would be greater cause for celebration 
indeed. Instead, the next sections examine why it did not, and why 
this failure should have come as no surprise. 
II. PARENTING, LEAVE POLICIES, AND LEAVE-TAKING PATTERNS 
BEFORE THE ENACTMENT OF THE FMLA 
Empirical data available prior to enactment of the FMLA 
demonstrated two things: women almost always take time away from 
work for childbirth and new parenting, even if their employers do not 
guarantee that they will have a job to return to;76 and men rarely take 
time off for new parenting, even if their employers do guarantee job 
restoration.77  
Whether women work outside the home in paid employment or 
not, they perform the majority of caretaking tasks for children.78 A 
 73. Id. at 1982–83. 
 74. Id. at 1983. 
 75. Id. at 1982 (noting that the FMLA tells employers that they cannot “evade leave 
obligations simply by hiring men”). 
 76. See infra notes 96–98, 225–28 and accompanying text. 
 77. See infra notes 99–103, 229–36 and accompanying text. 
 78. See ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT 271–78 (1989); Cahn, supra 
note 63, at 185 (citing survey of children who reported that their mothers performed the bulk of 
the tasks related to their care and noting that “[a]lthough the allocation of work within the 
family is becoming more equal, women still perform a disproportionate share of childcare”); 
Martha Fineman, The Nature of Dependencies and Welfare “Reform”, 36 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 287, 293–94 (1996); Ann Shalleck, Foundational Myths and the Reality of Dependency: 
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1992 telephone survey found, for example, that, according to both 
male and female respondents, women assume primary responsibility 
for raising minor children in sixty to seventy percent of households.79 
These numbers reflect not only the descriptive fact that women do 
more child care and “family work,” but also a normative judgment 
that this unequal burden is appropriate.80 As Deborah Rhode has 
observed, “[d]espite increasing public support for gender equality in 
social roles, most men and women still believe that fathers should be 
the primary breadwinners and that mothers should be the primary 
caretakers.”81  
Gendered leave-taking patterns both reflect and reinforce 
underlying caretaking patterns, as the “time immediately following 
childbirth has also been shown to be a critical period in shaping both 
men’s and women’s perceptions of parental competence and 
determining the long-term division of childrearing responsibilities.”82 
Parents who take leave early in their parenting journey are more 
likely to assume long-term caregiving responsibilities (and thus 
The Role of Marriage, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 197, 201 (2000). See generally 
JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER 71 (2000) (collecting data).  
 79.  See Ellen Galinsky & James T. Bond, Work and Family: The Experience of Mothers 
and Fathers in the Labor Force, in WHERE WE STAND: WOMEN AND WORK 79, 94 (Cynthia 
Costello & Barbara Kivimae Krimgold eds., 1996). Other surveys show similar results. See 
generally KATHARINE T. BARTLETT, GENDER AND LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 
(2002) (reviewing available research). 
 80. See BARTLETT, supra note 79, at 353 (noting that “while working women do twice as 
much family work as men, only one-quarter to one-third see this arrangement as unfair”) (citing 
Mary Clare Lennon & Sarah Rosenfield, Relative Fairness and the Division of Housework: The 
Importance of Options, 100 AM. J. SOC. 506, 507 (1994)). 
 81. Deborah L. Rhode, Balanced Lives, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 834, 842 (2002); see also 
WILLIAMS, supra note 78, at 26–27. 
 82. Angie K. Young, Assessing the Family and Medical Leave Act in Terms of Gender 
Equality, Work/Family Balance, and the Needs of Children, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 113, 124 
(1998) (citing Martin H. Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1047, 1056–57 
(1994)); see also Susan Deller Ross, Legal Aspects of Parental Leave: At the Crossroads, in 
PARENTAL LEAVE AND CHILD CARE: SETTING A RESEARCH AND POLICY AGENDA 93, 99 (Janet 
Shibley Hyde & Marilyn J. Essex eds., 1991). Ross writes: 
If we exclude men from the experience of caring for newborns [by denying job-
guaranteed paternity leave], are we not reinforcing the norms that drive them ever 
more into seeking fulfillment at work? And if men put their major emotional energies 
into work, does that not increase the pressure on their wives to play the most 
significant role at home? One can see the vicious cycle this creates. 
Ross, supra, at 99. 
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engage in leave-taking behavior as well), while those who eschew 
early parenting are likely to continue in that mode and unlikely to 
make future requests for leave.83 This pattern becomes gendered, 
since women almost automatically take some leave when they give 
birth to or adopt children and then assume greater long-term 
caretaking responsibilities than their male counterparts. Leave-
needers, over the long haul, are thus predominantly women. Surveys 
conducted prior to passage of the FMLA revealed these interlocking 
leave-taking and care-taking patterns.84  
Before federal law mandated leave under the FMLA, employers 
made it available, and employees took it, on predictably gendered 
terms. The most comprehensive study of leave-taking in the United 
States prior to enactment of the FMLA was done by the Families and 
Work Institute (FWI).85 In 1988, FWI commissioned a report on the 
effects of relatively new parental leave statutes that had been enacted 
in four states.86 Around that time, each of the four had enacted a leave 
law that bore at least some resemblance to the subsequently enacted 
FMLA.87  
Before enactment of those leave laws, eighty-three percent of 
surveyed employers reported that they offered some form of job-
guaranteed leave for disabilities relating to childbirth. The average 
leave period was eleven weeks.88 Most employers also reported that 
they permitted between six and nine additional weeks, unpaid, of 
 83. Martin H. Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1047, 1056–57 
(1994). 
 84. Id. at 1058 (citing LINDA HAAS, EQUAL PARENTHOOD AND SOCIAL POLICY: A STUDY 
OF PARENTAL LEAVE IN SWEDEN 158–60 (1992) (presenting the results of her study of the 
effect of the liberal use of Sweden’s paid parental leave policy by fathers)). 
 85. See JAMES T. BOND ET AL., FAMILIES AND WORK INSTITUTE, BEYOND THE PARENTAL 
LEAVE DEBATE: THE IMPACT OF LAWS IN FOUR STATES (1991) (studying parental leave laws in 
Minnesota, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin). 
 86. Id. at 17. 
 87. The primary differences between these state laws and the FMLA, passed five years 
later, were the length of mandatory leaves and the number of employers covered. See id. at 18–
19.  
 88. See id. at 29. The numbers given in this section reflect an average for the four states, 
even though in some cases a wide range existed from the highest to lowest values. See id. These 
leave periods are slightly more generous than both the medically recommended period of 
leave—six weeks for vaginal birth and eight weeks for caesarean birth—and the average 
maternity-related disability insurance claim of ten weeks. See id. at 30. 
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post-disability parenting leave.89 Although only a quarter of these 
employers had formal policies guaranteeing the availability of these 
leave periods,90 the combination of formal policies and informal 
practices meant that many employers were accommodating at least 
the minimal needs of biological mothers. Sixty-five percent of 
employers were in full compliance with the applicable state’s leave 
requirements before enactment of the statute.91 Adoptive parents were 
also given job-guaranteed leave by seventy-one percent of employers 
(before any state mandate that they do so).92 
The needs of biological fathers were also accommodated by 
employers, but to a lesser extent. While sixty percent of employers 
reported offering job-guaranteed leave to new fathers (8.2 weeks, on 
average), only nineteen percent had a formal policy for providing it.93 
Fewer employers provided job-guaranteed leave for biological fathers 
than for adoptive parents,94 and only thirty-four percent of employers 
were already providing paternity leave at a level required by the law 
before it was enacted.95  
The FWI study also examined the effect of state parental leave 
statutes on leave-taking patterns. It found that biological mothers 
took leave at an almost identical rate pre- and post-statute, and the 
length of leaves post-statute were no longer than before.96 Both 
before and after mandatory leave policies were put in place, mothers 
took an average of two weeks leave before childbirth and twelve 
weeks afterwards,97 leading the study authors to conclude that leave 
policies had little impact on the leave-needing or leave-taking 
patterns of biological mothers.98 
 89. See id. at 29. 
 90. See id. 
 91. See id. at 39. 
 92. See id. at 43–44. 
 93. See id. at 41. 
 94. See id. at 43. This again reflects an assumption that mothers will take parenting 
leave—even if they do not require maternity-related disability leave—more often than fathers.  
 95. Id. at 42. 
 96. See id. at 63, 65. Biological mothers that did not take leave at the time of childbirth 
did not just keep working—twelve percent quit to stay home with the child, five percent quit for 
some other reason, and one percent were fired or laid off.  
 97. See id. at 65. 
 98. See id. at 64–65. 
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The impact of leave laws on leave-taking behavior by biological 
fathers was slightly greater. According to the FWI study, the 
percentage of fathers who took leave associated with the birth of a 
child increased from seventy to seventy-five percent.99 But only 
around twenty percent of these fathers were forced to take unpaid 
leave, as most were able to draw from accrued vacation, sick, or 
personal leave. The average length of leave increased, however, by 
only one day—from 3.7 days to 4.7 days—after enactment of the 
mandatory leave laws.100 (According to survey responses of women, 
men actually do help when they are on leave, rather than going elk 
hunting as one Oregon legislator cautioned during the debate over the 
state’s mandatory leave law.).101  
Other studies confirm that almost no men take leave formally 
classified as parental, paternity, or family leave, even when their 
employers’ policies provide for it. A 1986 survey found that while 
thirty-seven percent of 322 respondents offered some form of 
parental leave to their male employees, not a single male employee 
took the available leave in over eighty-five percent of those 
establishments.102 Later surveys confirm the same pattern.103 
 99. See id. at 77. 
 100. See id. at 77–78.  
 101. See id. at 78 (reporting on the opponents of Oregon leave legislation). The study 
concluded that ninety-seven to ninety-eight percent of fathers used their parental leave time to 
care for their wives or newborn children, rather than abusing the leave by using the time 
“pursuing their own interests.” Id. 
 102. See CATALYST, REPORT ON A NATIONAL STUDY OF PARENTAL LEAVES 37 (1986); 
see, e.g., Michael Selmi, Family Leave and the Gender Wage Gap, 78 N.C. L. REV. 707, 755–
56 (2000); Young, supra note 82, at 113 (summarizing available data on paternal leave-taking); 
Janet Shibley Hyde et al., Fathers and Parental Leaves: Attitudes and Experiences, J. FAM. 
ISSUES, 616, 635 (1993) (citing study indicating that if they were offered paid paternity leave, 
thirty-eight percent of men predicted that they would take an average of eleven weeks, while 
thirty-five percent would take as much as a year off). 
 103. In another study, new fathers took an average of five days of leave, and seventy-one 
percent of those who took leave took five days or less. Most of these days were taken as 
vacation or personal days, rather than parental leave days. See Janet Shibley Hyde, Women and 
Maternity Leave: Empirical Data and Public Policy, 19 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 299, 307–09 
(1995); CHILDREN’S DEFENSE FUND—MINNESOTA, Parental Leave in Minnesota: A Survey of 
Employers, in REESTABLISHING THE VALUE OF FAMILIES: A GUIDE TO PUBLIC POLICY 3 
(2000), at http://www.cdf-mn.org/PDF/Publications/ParentalLeave.pdf (surveying 185 
employers employing 64,000 workers in Minnesota and revealing that of the men who took 
parental leave in 1998, 56.4% were away from the office for less than a week, 30.8% took one 
to two weeks, 10.3% took three to six weeks, and only 2.6% took the full twelve weeks they 
were allowed); see also JAMES A. LEVINE & TODD L. PITTINSKY, WORKING FATHERS: NEW 
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Men do not take parental leave for a variety of familiar reasons. 
External factors are significant. Men may “worry they’ll be ‘daddy-
tracked.’”104 Employers may react to requests for paternity leave with 
scorn or laughter.105 Even self-professed family-friendly workplaces 
may quietly discourage paternity leave or impliedly threaten men 
with career damage for taking leave made available by their own 
policies.106 Men fear that taking paternity leave will lead to retaliation 
or the loss of professional reputation,107 and conduct like that alleged 
in Knussman v. Maryland reinforces those fears. In Knussman, a state 
trooper requesting paternity leave was told by his supervisor that 
“God made women to have babies,” and unless the trooper’s wife 
was “in a coma or dead,” he could not take the leave available to 
primary caregivers.108 Although societal expectations have 
STRATEGIES FOR BALANCING WORK AND FAMILY 127–28 (1997) (describing the media interest 
in whether Microsoft’s Bill Gates would take paternity leave after the birth of his daughter in 
1996; the final announcement was that Gates would take “several days off”); Millicent Brown, 
Blair’s Baby Policy, SUNDAY MIRROR, Apr. 9, 2000 (reporting on British Prime Minister Tony 
Blair’s plans to go into “holiday mode,” which entails working a few hours each day, following 
the birth of his fourth child, despite urging from some groups to take a full-fledged paternity 
leave). 
 104. See Melissa Fletcher Stoeltje, The Time Has Not Quite Arrived for Paternity Leave for 
Fathers, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, July 25, 2002, at F1. 
 105. See Jeff Kramer, Regretfully, Daddy’s Back on the Job, ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, 
Feb. 17, 2003 (noting the “snickers of disdain or worse” that a father’s request for paternity 
leave might engender); Mary Kane, Paternity Leave Gains Acceptance in Work World; New 
Dads Take Time to Bond with Babies, TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 16, 2002, (Money), at 1 
(reporting story of one employee whose manager “just kind of chuckled and thought I was 
playing a practical joke on him” when he asked for paternity leave). 
 106. See Susan Chira, Fathers Who Want Time Off for Families Face Uphill Battle, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 21, 1993, at C6 (quoting James Levine: employers counsel fathers that “Real 
men—upwardly mobile men—don’t take leave”); Melinda Ligos, The Fear of Taking Paternity 
Leave, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2000, at G1 (reporting anecdotal evidence of employer 
discouragement of paternity leave). 
 107. See Diane E. Lewis, Giving Men Benefit of Fatherhood: More Companies Are 
Offering Paid Work Leaves to Male Employees, BOSTON GLOBE, June 22, 2003, at J1 (noting 
that the “fear may be justified,” given stories like that of a professional football player who 
incurred a fine of $11,000 for skipping a game in order to be present at his child’s birth). The 
justification for these fears may lessen as society evolves. See Rosemarie Feuerbach Twomey & 
Gwen E. Jones, The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993: A Longitudinal Study of Male and 
Female Perceptions, 3 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 229, 244, 248 (1999) (indicating that 
in 1992 men had a greater impression that taking leave would harm their careers, but in 1998 
women anticipated a stronger likelihood of damage). For a more expansive treatment of these 
issues, see generally SUZANNE BRAUN LEVINE, FATHER COURAGE: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN 
MEN PUT FAMILY FIRST (2000). 
 108. See Knussman v. Maryland, 272 F.3d 625, 629–30 (4th Cir. 2001). Determining 
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presumably evolved since then, a 1986 survey of CEOs and human 
resource directors revealed that sixty-three percent of respondents 
answered “none” to the question of what would be a reasonable 
length of time for paternity leave.109  
Even where paternity leave is not overtly or covertly discouraged, 
it is still viewed, at the very least, as unusual. For example, when a 
prominent New York Times reporter took a month of paternity leave, 
the newspaper’s honest explanation for his absence in his column 
space was described by another reporter as “miraculous.”110  
Beyond the external pressures, internal or personal factors can 
play a role in inhibiting men from taking leave. For many men, it is 
not “inwardly” acceptable to take time off to care for one’s 
children,111 and they may find it emasculating to take time designated 
as “paternity leave.”112 The fact that men who do take leave following 
the birth of a child rarely classify it as paternity leave evidences this 
phenomenon.113 Leave-taking men often try to have their leave 
classified as vacation or personal leave, rather than paternity leave, to 
avoid negative reactions from the employer or even co-workers as 
well as having to come to terms with their own desire to be home 
with children.114 
whether Knussman qualified as the primary caregiver was important to determine eligibility for 
paid versus unpaid leave under a Maryland statute. Id. at 628–29. 
 109. See DEBORAH RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER 122 (1989) (discussing survey); see also 
LEVINE & PITTINSKY, supra note 103, at 133 (quoting Malcolm Forbes: “New daddies need 
paternity leave like they need a hole in the head”); Colin Harrison, Here’s Baby. Dad Stays 
Home. Dad Gets Antsy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1993, at A17. 
 110. Stoeltje, supra note 104, at F1 (noting the rarity of a “high-profile man working in a 
notoriously competitive field” taking paternity leave). 
 111. See Harrison, supra note 109, at A17; see also Kane, supra note 105 (quoting 
Professor Joseph Pleck: “Men don’t classify it in their own minds as paternity leave”). 
 112. See Ligos, supra note 106, at G1 (noting one father’s reticence to take paternity leave 
for fear “that his co-workers would question his machismo” and another’s being told that he 
was “less of a man for wanting to care for [his] child”). England reports a drastic increase in 
paternity leave-taking—from nine percent in 1999 to forty-four percent in 2002. See Sarah 
Westcott, Paternity Leave Gets Thumbs Up From Dads, THE EXPRESS, June 8, 2002, at 11. Part 
of the increase in leave-taking—and decrease in stigma—may come from the fact that 
England’s Prime Minister took a quasi-paternity leave after the birth of his fourth child. See id. 
 113. See supra note 103. 
 114. See Kane, supra note 105 (citing family studies Professor Joseph Pleck, who claims 
that men go “undercover” to avoid the perception that they have taken formal paternity leave).  
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This record, reflecting gender-based allocations of caregiving and 
leave-taking, was solidly established by the time the 103d Congress 
undertook consideration of the bill to mandate family and medical 
leave that would ultimately become law.  
III. ADVOCACY, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, AND STRUCTURE OF THE 
FMLA: A BILL TO ACCOMMODATE MOTHERHOOD 
As the first law signed by President Clinton, the FMLA was read 
as a symbol of Washington’s change in power.115 In just one month, 
H.R. 1 sailed through both houses of Congress and earned a 
presidential signature—something that had not been accomplished in 
the previous seven years of Republican administrations. The FMLA 
was heralded as proof of the promised “end of gridlock” and a strong 
endorsement of Clinton’s “People First” campaign.116  
However, FMLA’s symbolic power surpassed its substance, since 
during the intervening years between introduction of the original bill 
by Representative Pat Schroeder in 1985 and passage of the ultimate 
Act in 1993, Congress had considerably weakened an already 
minimalist law.  
The enacted version of the FMLA was very much a compromise, 
passed after both houses of Congress considered and rejected 
numerous bills, and after bills they could agree upon were subjected 
twice to a presidential veto.117 The first bill introduced guaranteed 
eighteen weeks of parental leave every two years and twenty-six 
weeks for employee illness or disability every year.118 It applied to all 
 115. See Donna Lenhoff & Claudia Withers, Implementation of the Family and Medical 
Leave Act: Toward the Family-Friendly Workplace, 3 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 39, 40 (1994) 
(noting the record speed with which President Clinton signed the bill after taking office, in 
contrast to “a carefully worded campaign promise by George Bush” and “two Bush vetoes” in 
the preceding years). 
 116. See ELVING, supra note 1, at 11–13 (describing the bill signing ceremony for the 
FMLA).  
 117. See id. (describing in detail the legislative history of the FMLA). 
 118. See Parental and Disability Leave Act of 1985, H.R. 2020, 99th Cong., §§ 102(a), 
103(a) (1985); 131 CONG. REC. 8318 (Apr. 17, 1985) (Rep. Schroeder pointed out that the 
twenty-six weeks for temporary disability leave was meant to cover any pregnancy disability 
absence, leaving the eighteen weeks of parental leave strictly for the time spent taking care of 
the child.). 
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employers with at least one employee.119 Bills in subsequent years 
reduced the number of covered employers,120 reduced the length of 
leave available,121 and combined medical and family leave into a 
single, and ultimately shorter, allotment.122 
The final bill lost some of the power of earlier bills and added 
nothing to overcome their deficiencies. The general limitations of the 
Act—measured against the goal of accommodating workers’ 
caretaking obligations and serious illnesses—have been widely noted. 
The leave provided is relatively short, unpaid,123 and nearly forty 
percent of employees in this country either work for employers who 
are not covered or are themselves not eligible for leave under the 
 119. See Parental and Disability Leave Act of 1985, H.R. 2020, 99th Cong., § 101(3) 
(1985).  
 120. See, e.g., Family and Medical Leave Act of 1987, H.R. 925, 100th Cong., § 102 
(1987) (exempting employers with less than fifteen employees within 200 miles of facility); 
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1989, H.R. 770, 101st Cong., § 101(5)(a) (1989) (applying, 
for the first three years, to employers with at least fifty employees within a seventy-five mile 
radius, and then to employers with at least thirty-five employees within that same distance).  
 121. See, e.g., Family and Medical Leave Act of 1989, H.R. 770, 101st Cong., 
§§ 103(a)(1), 104(a)(1) (1989) (proposing ten weeks of family leave during a twenty-four 
month period and fifteen weeks of medical leave within a twelve month period). 
 122. See, e.g., 136 CONG. REC. 9986 (1990) (adopting an amendment to the Family and 
Medical Leave Act of 1989, H.R. 770, proposed by Rep. Gordon and Rep. Weldon, to change 
the total leave time for both family leave and medical leave to twelve weeks within a twelve 
month period). 
 123. Proponents decided early on not to push for paid leave because it seemed to be a 
political impossibility. See ELVING, supra note 1, at 30. Annual “Employee Benefits Surveys” 
conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics report that only one to two percent of employees 
have access to paid maternity or paternity leave, and these numbers are the same for small and 
large companies. Those employers that do offer paid leave do so only for full-time employees. 
See Jane Waldfogel, Family Leave Coverage in the 1990s, MONTHLY LABOR REV. Oct. 1999, 
at 13, 14 tbl.1 (reporting data on the percentage of private-sector employees with family leave 
coverage from 1990 to 1997). As a result of the 1996 FMLA study finding that the decrease in 
income prevented more parents from taking leave, President Clinton directed the Department of 
Labor to explore the use of unemployment compensation for parental leave. Birth and Adoption 
Unemployment Compensation, 65 Fed. Reg. 37210, 37210 (June 13, 2000) (codified at 20 
C.F.R. pt. 604). Birth and Adoption Unemployment Compensation (BAA-UC), if a state adopts 
it, has to be applied to all employees granted leave for the birth or adoption of a child, 
regardless of their employer’s size. Id. at 37212. A federal court dismissed an effort to have the 
regulation declared invalid in 2002 because the rule had not been adopted by any state and the 
court did not foresee its adoption in the near future. See LPA Inc. v. Chao, 211 F. Supp. 2d 160, 
166 (D.D.C. 2002). In December of 2002, the Department of Labor solicited comments about 
recalling the BAA-UC. Unemployment Compensation—Trust Fund Integrity Rule: Birth and 
Adoption Unemployment Compensation; Removal of Regulations, 67 Fed. Reg. 72,122 
(proposed Dec. 4, 2002).  
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statute. The combined force of these limitations, as many 
commentators have noted, is a powerful blow to the statute’s 
effectiveness.124 
The specific limitations of the Act—measured against a goal of 
gender equality—are less widely noted, and yet just as glaring. 
Despite the virtually unrefuted evidence available to Congress that 
men do not tend to avail themselves of paternity leave very often, it 
built nothing into the FMLA to encourage them to do otherwise.125 
To the contrary, it builds in disincentives; or at least incentives for 
any particular set of parents to prefer maternal over paternal 
caregiving.  
For example, to the extent available parental leave is unpaid, there 
exists a clear incentive for a couple to prefer maternal leave over 
paternal leave, given the likelihood that a husband out-earns his 
wife.126 Considering also that a biological mother will undoubtedly 
take at least some time off because of childbirth, it makes practical 
sense in many cases for her to continue on leave for the “parenting” 
portion, rather than forcing both spouses to suffer the potential 
adverse consequences of taking leave. 
Other provisions of the FMLA reinforce traditional leave-taking 
patterns as well. For example, employers are permitted to deny leave 
 124. See generally Stephanie C. Bovee, The Family Medical Leave Act: State Sovereignty 
and the Narrowing of Fourteenth Amendment Protection, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 
1011 (2001); Ruth Colker, Hypercapitalism: Affirmative Protections for People With 
Disabilities, Illness and Parenting Responsibilities Under United States Law, 9 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 213 (1997); Cristina Duarte, The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993: Paying the 
Price for an Imperfect Solution, 32 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 833 (1994); Maxine Eichner, 
Square Peg in a Round Hole: Parenting Policies and Liberal Theory, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 133 
(1998); Hayes, supra note 2; Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment 
Discrimination Law, Women’s Cultural Caregiving, and the Limits of Economic and Liberal 
Legal Theory, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 371 (2001); Malin, supra note 82; Selmi, supra note 
102; Michael Selmi, The Limited Vision of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 44 VILL. L. REV. 
395 (1999); Joseph Willis, The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993: A Progress Report, 36 
BRANDEIS J. FAM. L. 95 (1997–98); Young, supra note 102; Marc Mory & Lia Pistilli, Note, 
The Failure of the Family and Medical Leave Act: Alternative Proposals for Contemporary 
American Families, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 689 (2000–2001). 
 125. See Young, supra note 82, at 143–44 (noting the lack of incentives in the FMLA for 
men to take parental leave); Selmi, supra note 102, at 755–56 (summarizing studies showing 
that “few men avail themselves of family leave”). 
 126. See Michelle Conlin, Look Who’s Bringing Home More Bacon, BUS. WK., Jan. 27, 
2003, at 85 (reporting that despite the progress made since the 1980s, two-thirds of men still 
earn more than their wives). 
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to “key employees,” defined as the most highly paid ten percent of 
the workforce, if they can show that granting leave would cause the 
employer a substantial hardship.127 Because of gender-imbalanced 
power structures in the workplace, this primarily exempts men (and 
deprives them of leave), and, for the women it does affect, the 
exemption reinforces the notion that mothering is inconsistent with 
employment success.128 The key employee exception also deprives 
employees of high-ranking role models who could, by taking leave, 
stymie the notion that doing so is a sign of inadequate commitment to 
work.129  
The only feature of the FMLA that might potentially force men to 
shoulder more caretaking responsibilities than they otherwise would 
is the family illness provision, which permits an employee to take 
leave only to care for his or her own parent—and not to care for a 
mother- or father-in-law.130 Thus, in some cases, the burden of the 
“sandwich generation,” those middle-age women who might find 
themselves simultaneously caring for either young or “boomerang” 
children, and elderly parents,131 may be shared by men. 
 127. See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2614(b) (2000); 29 C.F.R. 
§§ 825.216(2)(c), 825.217–825.219 (2003). 
 128. See Young, supra note 82, at 144. The exception for key employees also sends “a 
powerful message to all other male and female employees: If you want to be part of the highest 
paid bracket, do not expect to take parental leave.” Id. 
 129. See Stoeltje, supra note 104, at F1 (quoting Jodi Grant of the National Partnership for 
Women and Families, who stated that “[a]pproval from higher-ups is key in combating societal 
stigmas about paternity leave . . . [i]t helps when someone senior takes paternity leave and then 
later gets promoted”). 
 130. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611(7), 2612(a)(1)(C) (2000); 29 C.F.R. § 825.113(b) (2003) 
(requiring leave to be for a biological parent and not for a parent “in law”). 
 131. Although the term “sandwich generation” is gender-neutral, the burdens it describes 
fall mostly on women in their fifties “who must work to support both younger and older family 
members, including so-called ‘boomerang children’ who have returned home as adults because 
they cannot make it on their own, as well as frail parents or in-laws.” Mary Murray, Survey 
Counters Stereotypes, Finds Life Begins at 50 for Many, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1991, at 3B. See 
also Ronald Kotulak, Study Finds Midlife ‘Best Time, Best Place To Be,’ CHI. TRIB., Feb. 16, 
1999, at 1N (citing study by Orville Brim, which found that “[t]wenty percent of midlifers have 
grown children at home, 5 percent have their parents living with them, 6 percent are taking care 
of grandchildren full time, and 10 percent have another family member or friend living at 
home”); Jane Glenn Haas, If You Don’t Care Now, You Will . . . , ORANGE COUNTY REG., May 
18, 2003 (citing a study by The National Alliance for Caregiving, which estimates that forty-
one percent of middle-aged women “juggle kids, spouse, home—and now an aging parent”). 
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Post-enactment litigation has given little or no opportunity to 
reinforce the FMLA’s supposed role in promoting gender equality. 
Most cases have raised technical issues that do not call for courts to 
consider the FMLA’s commitment to equality, or analyze its 
underlying purpose at all. FMLA cases have rarely involved the Act’s 
substantive protections, but instead have raised procedural issues like 
the availability of jury trial132 or the validity of regulations governing 
the technical administration of employee leaves.133  
The first (and perhaps only) true gender discrimination claim 
under the FMLA was Knussman, discussed above,134 a case 
challenging the denial of a state trooper’s request for paternity 
leave.135 The jury found that the supervisor who denied the request 
had created, in effect, an “irrebuttable presumption that the mother is 
the primary care giver, and therefore entitled to greater employment 
benefits.”136 The appellate court recognized this approach as 
reminiscent of the many state statutes struck down on Equal 
Protection Clause grounds during the 1970s—statutes that had 
presumed men to be unfit to raise children137 and presumed women to 
be especially or exclusively fit for the task.138 But Knussman sets no 
new legal ground and, if anything, reminds us how entrenched the 
cultural bias against paternity leave remains. 
This statutory structure, then, simply does not account for the 
main obstacle to equality for working mothers—the reluctance of 
men to share caretaking tasks and draw on available leave to do so. 
 132. See, e.g., Frizzell v. Southwest Motor Freight, 154 F.3d 641, 643 (6th Cir. 1998) 
(holding that the FMLA creates a right to jury trial). 
 133. See, e.g., Dormeyer v. Comerica Bank-Illinois, 223 F.3d 579, 581–82 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(holding invalid an administrative regulation forcing employers to give FMLA leave to 
ineligible employees who requested it unless the employer responded promptly to inform the 
requesting employee that leave was unavailable); see also McGregor v. Autozone, Inc., 180 
F.3d 1305, 1307–08 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding invalid an administrative regulation requiring 
employers to notify employee at the beginning of leave period if available paid leave is to run 
concurrently with FMLA leave). 
 134. See supra text accompanying note 108. 
 135. See generally Knussman v. Maryland, 272 F.3d 625 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 136. Id. at 635. 
 137. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (invalidating statute presuming 
unmarried fathers unfit for custody purposes). 
 138. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (invalidating statute giving 
unwed mothers, but not unwed fathers, the power to veto a proposed adoption of their children). 
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This failure seems odd, given the law’s origins and the goals of its 
drafters and congressional proponents.  
The FMLA was pioneered by lawyers at the Women’s Legal 
Defense Fund,139 and sheparded through seven years on Capitol Hill 
by a non-governmental working group they led.140 Feminists pitched 
the idea of federal leave legislation in gender-neutral terms and took 
great pains over the years to fight back “mere motherhood” bills.141  
The legal landscape at the time parental leave was first proposed 
at the federal level provides important context for the shape the 
proposals took. Congress had enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act (PDA) in 1978, an amendment to Title VII.142 The PDA 
established that pregnancy discrimination was a form of sex 
discrimination and that pregnant employees were to be treated like 
workers with comparable temporary disabilities.143 
Part of the impetus for federal leave legislation was a case 
working its way through the federal court system in the early 1980s. 
At issue in California Federal Savings & Loan Association v. 
Guerra144 was whether the State of California could require 
employers to give women four months leave for childbirth without 
running afoul of the second clause of the PDA.145 Feminists split over 
this case, disagreeing about whether it should be interpreted to 
require that employers treat pregnant women exactly the same as 
comparably disabled workers, or simply no worse. One camp, led by 
NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, advocated for “equal 
treatment” laws that would prohibit employers from singling out 
pregnant women for especially advantageous leave provisions. The 
equal treatment feminists insisted that permitting special treatment of 
pregnant women would promote harmful stereotypes about women 
that had historically been used to their disadvantage and would likely 
 139. This organization is now called The National Partnership for Women and Families. 
See http://www.nationalpartnership.org (last visited Apr. 19, 2003). 
 140. See ELVING, supra note 1, at 29 (describing the origins of the working group). 
 141. Id. at 38–39 (citing one example of the working group’s objection to a mothers-only 
proposal). 
 142. See Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e(k) (2000)). 
 143. See Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978). 
 144. 479 U.S. 272 (1987). 
 145. See id. at 284. 
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be used to do so in the future.146 The opposing position (which 
eventually carried the day in the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Guerra147) was premised on the idea that accommodating pregnancy 
was itself a necessary component of equality, regardless of how any 
other group of workers was treated.  
In 1984, a district judge in California struck down the provision 
because it violated Title VII’s promise of equal treatment by 
guaranteeing leave only to women.148  
The push for federal leave legislation was catalyzed by this 
decision, although Congressional proponents and feminist advocates 
saw the problem it produced in different terms. Representative 
Harold Berman, a legislator from California who had been 
responsible, as a state legislator, for the California law that had just 
been declared invalid,149 thought federal legislation was necessary to 
“require employers to grant leaves for new mothers.”150 
The feminists working behind the scenes, however, were adamant 
that any legislation must reflect the equal treatment principles fought 
for in Guerra. Their commitment to equal treatment grew from two 
main concerns: that special treatment for women would engender 
negative consequences in the long run and that accommodating 
maternity alone would mean other leave needs would never be met 
since they were less compelling to legislators.151 The feminist 
advocates, some of whom had worked on the PDA passed six years 
earlier, saw its limitations–that employers could refuse leave to 
pregnant women as long as they refused it to comparably disabled 
 146. See Brief Amici Curiae of the National Organization for Women (NOW) et al., in 
Support of Neither Party, California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) 
(No. 85-494); see also Wendy Williams, Equality’s Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal 
Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325, 366–70 
(explaining and advocating for the equal treatment approach to pregnancy leave laws, in 
contrast to the special treatment approach). 
 147. 479 U.S. at 284–90 (1987). 
 148. See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 33 Empl. Prac. Dec. 34,227, 34 Fair 
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 562 (C.D. Cal. 1984); see also ELVING, supra note 1, at 19–23 
(discussing the impact of the district court’s decision on the push for federal leave legislation). 
 149. See ELVING, supra note 1, at 18–19. 
 150. Id. at 19. 
 151. See ELVING, supra note 1, at 23. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol15/iss1/3
p  7 Grossman book pages.doc  4/23/2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2004]  Job Security Without Equality 43 
 
 
 
employees–and pushed for parental legislation to cure that 
problem.152 
The bills were thus drafted and pitched in gender-neutral terms. 
Leave legislation was designed, the advocates indicated, not to 
accommodate motherhood, but to more generally accommodate the 
need of all employees to balance work and family responsibilities in 
an era where a majority of mothers with young children work.153 
Leave legislation, they argued, gives “employees job security and 
health-insurance in situations when they must put their family needs 
before their job responsibilities.”154 
Through its many iterations, the proposed leave legislation 
remained gender-neutral—guaranteeing men and women an equal 
right to take family and medical leave. But even as the virtues of 
equal treatment were being espoused, and gender-neutral bills were 
taken under consideration, the need to accommodate motherhood was 
the force driving the legislation forward. Pediatrician T. Berry 
Brazelton was a repeat witness in Congressional hearings on the 
importance of mother-baby bonding to children’s development.155 
Films of a new mother bonding with her baby were a part of his usual 
presentation.156 Other aspects of the early sets of hearings made clear 
that most supporters of leave legislation were concerned with 
motherhood rather than parenthood. One expert surprised the 
audience by talking about the dangers of separating “parents” and 
“infants” during the first months of life, as if either parent would 
do.157 Indeed, some members of Congress expressed concern as later 
bills enlarged to provide leave to care for sick family members that 
the “aura” of motherhood would be lost and the legislation would 
lose its appeal.158  
 152. See id. at 22. 
 153. See Lenhoff & Withers, supra note 115, at 48. 
 154. Id. at 49. 
 155. See ELVING, supra note 1, at 40, 46. 
 156. See id. at 50. 
 157. Id. at 27 (describing testimony of psychologist Edward Zigler). 
 158. Id. at 78. In fact, the addition of family care provisions improved the legislations 
enactability because it attracted the interest and support of the powerful AARP, whose members 
liked the idea of their grown children being able to take time off to care for them. Id. at 78, 118, 
157, 165. 
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Even NOW LDEF, the leader of the equal treatment camp staked 
out in Guerra, played on the trope of motherhood, sending members 
of Congress cards on mother’s day urging their support for leave 
legislation.159 And Jane O’Grady, a well-known labor advocate from 
the AFL-CIO who had played an integral part in the passage of Title 
VII after “sex” had been added to defeat the bill,160 appealed to 
younger men in Congress who had “younger professional women for 
wives.”161 
Formal attempts were made to offer maternity-only substitutes for 
gender-neutral leave bills, including one notable effort by Senator 
Dan Quayle.162 But these attempts were stymied by those who 
insisted the bill formally protect more than just motherhood. And 
when leave legislation (H.R. 770) first made it through both houses 
of Congress in 1990, near Mother’s Day, (to be subsequently vetoed 
by President Bush), Representative Pat Schroeder proudly observed: 
“We finally did something real besides chocolate and cards.”163  
Note the difference between the role of gender neutrality for 
parental leave advocates and the role it played in Hibbs. For the 
advocates, neutrality permitted women both to gain protection for 
motherhood and avoid the special treatment “trap.”164 For the 
Supreme Court, neutrality was central to Congress’s purpose of 
achieving gender equality.165 By making sure men had the right to 
take caregiving leave without losing their jobs, a gender neutral leave 
law would encourage men to assume greater caregiving 
responsibilities, thereby equalizing the burdens between mothers and 
fathers, and making both women and men unattractive to employers 
seeking to minimize the costs of temporary employment interruptions 
 159. See id. at 105. NOW LDEF ultimately pulled out from working on the bill in protest 
over its diminishing coverage and the lack of paid leave. Id. at 225. 
 160. See CHARLES W. WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 109, 113, 122–23 (describing efforts of 
Jane O’Grady and “O’Grady’s Raiders” to get members to the floor for the ultimately 
successful vote on Title VII). 
 161. See ELVING, supra note 1, at 154. 
 162. See id. at 109. The coalition for leave also convinced Democrat Tim Penny not to 
introduce his so-called “Mother’s Day Amendment,” which would have provided only for 
maternity leave. Id. at 175–80. 
 163. Id. at 181–82. 
 164. Id. at 224. 
 165. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003). 
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and early exits from the workforce. Men’s access to leave, in this 
view, should be a benefit to women, as well as to men, who might 
enjoy being more involved with their children.  
Yet many proponents in Congress seemed to support the notion of 
a mandatory leave law in spite of its neutrality, which seemed to 
strike them as unnecessary. The feminist advocates were then in the 
odd position of having to sell members on the idea of neutrality itself. 
The appeal they made was not—as the Supreme Court re-envisioned 
it—a pitch for fatherhood. Instead of pointing out that men would be 
able—and perhaps more inclined—to take paternity leave if the law 
required employers to provide it, they emphasized the value of 
mandatory sick leave. They pointed to the “800,000 men [who] stand 
to benefit from the law each year,”166 an estimate from a GAO Report 
predicting that while one-half of the total FMLA leaves would be 
taken by men,167 none of them would be taken to care for newborn or 
newly adopted children.168  
The leave legislation was pushed for its neutral family-
friendliness rather than its feminism, and most advocates believed an 
imperfect law to be better than no law.169 Family-friendliness versus 
equality as a touchstone made for a more politically palatable law.170 
Pro-family was the message the bill carried, without carrying any 
normative conception of an egalitarian family or an egalitarian 
workplace. President Clinton reinforced this styling of the law, 
pronouncing at the signing ceremony that “American workers will no 
longer have to choose between the job they need and the family they 
love.”171 For feminist advocates, the FMLA, as enacted, came to be 
accepted as a placeholder, which laid the groundwork for a better bill 
in the future once legislators and the public got used to the idea of a 
 166. Lenhoff & Withers, supra note 115, at 49 (describing the feminist lobbying effort for 
leave legislation). 
 167. See id. at 51. 
 168. Id.; see also 139 CONG. REC. 1730 (Feb. 2, 1993). 
 169. NOW LDEF rejected this strategy and ultimately withdrew from advocacy for the 
FMLA. See ELVING, supra note 1, at 225. 
 170. See Nina J. Easton, “I’m Not a Feminist but.  .  .  .”; Can the Women’s Movement 
March Into the Mainstream?, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1992, (Magazine), at 12 (describing the 
emergence of “family-friendly” feminism and its role in the push for leave legislation). 
 171. Statement on Signing the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 1 PUB. PAPERS 50 
(Feb. 5, 1993).  
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mandatory leave law. They would claim only “fairly modest” success 
in dealing with the myriad conflicts that employees face between 
work and family when the FMLA became law.172  
In the end, the feminists prevailed in insisting that men be 
permitted to take parenting leave. But the idea that they might 
actually take parenting leave was relegated to an unlikely 
consequence rather than a legislative goal.173 The advocates who had 
played such an important role in drafting leave legislation, stated, 
after the FMLA was signed into law, only that the Act “may help” 
break down stereotypes about child care as “women’s work,” and that 
it “may even encourage men to help care for their families.”174 But, 
they stated, “[r]egardless of whether the FMLA encourages men to 
shoulder more family caretaking responsibilities, men will use the 
FMLA a great deal.”175 (This statement turned out to be prescient, as 
men routinely invoke the provisions of the FMLA when they face 
serious illnesses, but hardly ever to take care of their children.176). 
While Congress ultimately passed a gender-neutral leave law, its 
vision of equality was distinctly less inspired than that attributed to it 
by the Supreme Court in Hibbs. Although its formal findings in the 
FMLA as enacted include a statement that “it is important for the 
development of children and the family unit that fathers and mothers 
be able to participate in early childrearing,”177 legislative debate of 
the various proposed leave laws give little support for the idea that it 
was designed to bring about equal parenthood. 
The desire to avoid discrimination against women was bandied 
about on both sides of the aisle. Republicans feigned concern that if a 
parental leave law was passed, women would suffer discrimination at 
the hands of employers who would refuse to hire them at all. 
Democrats argued that if leave legislation did not pass, women would 
suffer discrimination at the hands of employers who would refuse to 
 172. See Lenhoff & Withers, supra note 115, at 39–40. 
 173. Many commentators assumed the contrary—that men would take parental leave if 
offered. See, e.g., Ross, supra note 82, at 104 (“the FMLA provides . . . family leave that a 
significant number of men will take”).  
 174. Lenhoff & Withers, supra note 115, at 49. 
 175. Id. at 50.  
 176. See infra text accompanying notes 220–21. 
 177. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(1) (2000). 
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take them back following leave for childbirth, parenting, or leave to 
satisfy caretaking obligations. Both sides seemed to agree that 
women would take care of children; they disagreed about the likely 
consequences of mandating that their jobs be held while they did this. 
For example, while H.R. 1, the bill that would ultimately become 
law, was under consideration in the House of Representatives, the 
late and venerable Representative Patsy Mink noted in support of it: 
“Women will be the greatest beneficiary of this bill. Women 
constitute the largest providers as single parent families. They lose 
their jobs today if their children need them at home. Their job 
stability will be assured under this bill.”178  
Arguing against the bill, Representative Boehner displayed 
concern for the gender discrimination the FMLA would create: 
“What do you tell the young women denied a place in the work force 
because a small employer cannot afford the risk of hiring her for fear 
that she will be gone 12 weeks a year?”179 Representative DeLay 
expressed the same concern: “Moreover, the worst victims of this bill 
are the very people its sponsors propose to help: It invites 
discrimination against women of child bearing age and will thwart 
the ascension of women into the more prominent positions of our 
society.”180 Representative Dunn, speaking against the bill “as a 
woman,” made her assumptions explicit, noting the likely 
discrimination against women that would follow: “I believe we all 
appreciate that it is the women of America who will almost always 
take on the burden of providing the care for children, for the elderly, 
and for the aged and the sick.”181  
Some of the assumptions about women as leave-takers are 
biologically driven, since women are likely to require a medically 
related leave following childbirth and, if breastfeeding, are likely to 
have a more compelling need for early parenting leave.182 But many 
 178. 139 CONG. REC. 1986 (1993) (debating H.R. 1 on the floor of the house). 
 179. Id. at 1989. 
 180. Id. at 1993. 
 181. Id. at 1999. Representative Dunn noted a survey showing that forty-five percent of 
small businesses indicated that they would “be more hesitant to hire . . . young women who 
may have to ask to take leave to care for young children.” Id. 
 182. Breastfeeding does create a wrinkle for any theory of equal parenting, since fathers 
and mothers are obviously not fungible in this regard. For discussion of the need for employers 
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of the statements in debate clearly contemplated that parenting leave, 
too, would be something only women would or should take, even for 
leaves to care for non-infant children. Thus Representative Emerson, 
speaking “as the father of four daughters,” cautioned against 
“legislat[ing] women into unemployment,” since “the primary 
responsibility for child care still falls mainly to women; [and] women 
will be the predominate ones using mandated leave.”183  
Proponents of the bill made similar assumptions about caretaking, 
like Representative Nadler, speaking strongly in favor of the bill, 
decried discrimination against “working parents, and especially 
against working women who are still the primary care givers for most 
American families.”184 There was even speculation among court-
watchers that Justice Rehnquist’s somewhat surprising majority 
opinion in Hibbs may have been inspired by watching his own 
daughter struggle to balance a high-powered career with her 
responsibilities as a single mother.185 
Other arguments in the House assumed women to be the sole 
leave-takers as well. Representative Boehlert, for example, reacted to 
an argument being made on the floor:  
And then we are told . . . “You know what? They’ll take 
advantage of this family leave legislation.” The “they” are the 
women of America who have a child . . . I say to those who 
make that point that they do not understand America’s women 
and why America’s women work. . . . Those who suggest that 
they will take advantage of this bill and stay home and treat it 
as if it is vacation time just do not get it.186 
The record reveals occasional references to men taking leave, or at 
least references to gender-neutral categories like “workers” or 
“parents” who need leave. Representative Gilman noted that H.R. 1 
to accommodate breastfeeding and the resulting consequences, see generally Shana M. 
Christrup, Breastfeeding in the American Workplace, 9 AM. U. J. GENDER & SOC. POL’Y & L. 
471 (2001); Lara Gardner, A Step Toward True Equality in the Workplace: Requiring Employer 
Accommodation for Breastfeeding Women, 17 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 259 (Fall 2002). 
 183. 139 CONG. REC. 2020 (1993). 
 184. Id. at 2021. 
 185. See Linda Greenhouse, Heartfelt Words from the Rehnquist Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 
6, 2003, at D3. 
 186. Id. at 1981. 
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“not only favors working mothers who must take time off from work 
for child bearing purposes, but all workers who must take leave in 
cases involving a birth, adoption, or a serious health condition of a 
close family member.”187 
Similar themes run through the floor debate during the Senate’s 
consideration of S. 5, a bill introduced a few weeks after H.R. 1 was 
introduced in the House,188 as Senator Hatch warned of the “insidious 
discriminatory impact of this legislation.”189 The bill, he predicted, 
“may lead to discrimination against younger women of childbearing 
age. They are the employees most likely to take advantage of this 
mandate and, as a result, some employers who have to watch costs 
will want to avoid hiring them, if possible.”190  
In both House and Senate debates, polls of employers about their 
likely response to leave legislation were frequently invoked.191 
Opponents used a Gallup poll, showing that forty percent of 
employers would be less likely to hire women of childbearing age if a 
law mandating leave for them was enacted, to argue that the law 
would negatively impact women.192 Proponents relied on information 
provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics showing that only thirty-
seven percent of employers provided maternity leave (before 
enactment of the FMLA) and a mere eighteen percent provided 
paternity leave, to argue that women needed the law’s protection.193 
 187. Id. at 1987; see also id. at 1995 (Rep. Waters) (“It will allow women and men to be 
able to give their full attention to a family crisis, or changes in their family such as the birth or 
adoption of a child, without having to worry about their job or their insurance.”). 
 188. Ultimately, it was the substance of S. 5 that became law. The Senate first passed S. 5, 
then took up consideration of H.R. 1, but voted to delete the text and replace it with the text 
from S. 5. The House then voted to approve the revised H.R. 1 and, with passage in both 
houses, it was then sent to the newly inaugurated President Clinton for signature. See ELVING, 
supra note 1, at 282–85. 
 189. Id. at 1713.  
 190. See id. 
 191. Id. at 2024 (statement of Representative Franks). Representative Franks states: 
Not to mention the fact that employers have stated that, if this bill should pass, they 
may be less likely to hire young women in their childbearing years. It is impossible to 
measure the costs to our economy of the lost talent and productivity of these women 
who will not be given a chance, merely because they may choose at some point in the 
future, to start a family. 
Id. 
 192. Id. at 1713 (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
 193. See, e.g., id. at 1691 (statement of Sen. Dodd). 
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Members also relied on the report of the U.S. General Accounting 
Office (GAO), which prepared a cost estimate of one of the early 
versions of the FMLA. That report noted, with respect to the 
provision permitting leave to care for newborn or newly adopted 
children, that “[u]npaid leave to care for new children is used almost 
exclusively by women.”194 The GAO based this conclusion on studies 
of U.S. firms and companies in countries that mandate or provide 
parental leave for men and women.195 
The Congressional Record is replete with statements about 
paternity leave that show its misunderstood purpose. While no federal 
legislator raised the prospect of elk hunting during paternity leave—
or other misuse of the leave time—there was an oft expressed 
concern about the utility of such leave. The report of the Committee 
on Education and Labor, Minority Views, for example, expressed 
disdain for a law that would allow an employee to be on leave for 
twelve weeks following a birth or adoption “even though an able-
bodied spouse is at home to care for the child—whether the spouse 
was home on leave under this legislation from his or her place of 
employment or was simply unemployed.”196 The phrase “able-bodied 
spouse” obviously refers to the mother, despite the Committee’s 
weak attempt to express a gender-neutral concern.  
The media took their cues from Congress and the bill’s advocates. 
By the time the FMLA became law, equality was not part of its 
symbolic message. It became a victory for workers’ rights over the 
powerful business lobbies.197 It was a victory for women only to the 
extent it permitted them time off to give birth to or adopt children 
without being fired. Personal testimonials by Senators Boxer and 
Feinstein about their experiences of being forced out of jobs after 
giving birth to their children were used to “personalize the plight of 
 194. 139 CONG. REC. 1730 (1993) (GAO Report). 
 195. See id. 
 196. H.R. REP. NO. 103-8, pt. 1, at 69–70 (1993) (emphasis added). 
 197. See, e.g., Susan Feeney, Family Leave Approved, Ending 7-Year Stalemate, DALLAS 
MORNING NEWS, Feb. 5, 1993, at 1A (noting that opponents gripe about the “undue burdens on 
small businesses”); Ellen Goodman, Family Leave Victory: It’s Only the First Step, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Feb. 7, 1993, at 73 (editorial) (describing the FMLA as “a landmark in changing 
attitudes about family and work”); Rebecca H. Patterson, Family Leave: What’s It All About?, 
ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 5, 1993, at 1A (describing the FMLA as “a milestone for family 
and worker rights”). 
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working mothers,” and thus the importance of the FMLA to 
women.198 But no one ever called the law a victory for equality. 
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE FMLA ON LEAVE POLICIES AND LEAVE-
TAKING: A MIRROR OF THE PAST 
The FMLA established the Commission on Family and Medical 
Leave and gave it the responsibility for studying the impact of the 
legislation on both employers and employees.199 The Commission has 
conducted two major sets of surveys, the first in 1995200 and the 
second in 2000,201 to study the impact of the FMLA on both the rate 
and type of employee leave-taking and on employers. 
According to these surveys, the FMLA had a significant effect on 
leave policies, but relatively little effect on leave-taking behavior. 
According to the 1995 survey, two-thirds of covered employers made 
some change to their leave policies because of the FMLA.202 Most of 
the changes involved adding or enlarging the leave available for 
fathers, something required by the FMLA that only a minority of 
companies had voluntarily provided prior to its enactment.203 By 
1995, nearly seventy percent of employers had made some change 
relating to paternal leave.204 Five years later, when the second surveys 
were conducted, the number of non-covered establishments offering 
unpaid leave for either parent to care for a newborn, for example, 
increased even further, from 83.8% to 93.8%.205 The FMLA induced 
 198. Glenn F. Bunting, Leave Measure Hits Home for Feinstein, Boxer Politics, L.A. 
TIMES, Feb. 5, 1993, at 3. The depiction of the bill in feminist terms came mostly in trite recaps, 
noting failures and successes in the “Year of the Woman,” which 1992 had been designated. 
See Mary Voboril, 1992: Year of Small Steps for Womankind, OREGONIAN, Jan. 2, 1993, at A4 
(noting Congress’s failure to reintroduce leave legislation in 1992 as reflective of Congress’s 
“little enthusiasm for most feminist issues”). 
 199. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2631, 2632(1) (2000). 
 200. In 1995, the Commission on Leave commissioned two surveys: an employee survey 
and an establishment survey. See FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE SURVEYS 2000, supra note 6, 
at 1-7. The results of both were presented, with other Commission findings, in COMM’N ON 
FAMILY & MED. LEAVE, A WORKABLE BALANCE: REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FAMILY AND 
MEDICAL LEAVE POLICIES (1996) [hereinafter A WORKABLE BALANCE]. 
 201.  See FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE SURVEYS 2000, supra note 6, at 1-4. 
 202. See A WORKABLE BALANCE, supra note 200, at 66–67. 
 203. See Waldfogel, supra note 123, at 14. 
 204. See FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE SURVEYS 2000, supra note 6, at 1-9. 
 205. See id. at 5–9. 
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other common changes as employers adapted to the new mandates.206 
Employers, for the most part, have reported that they were able to 
implement the leave policies required by the Act with minimal cost 
or administrative difficulty,207 and with “no noticeable effect” on 
productivity or profitability.208 
The Department of Labor surveys may misrepresent the state of 
gender-neutrality in the provision of leave policies, however. Other 
surveys suggest some important differences in the length and type of 
leave provided that are not captured by the official surveys. For 
example, a 1998 survey by the Families and Work Institute Business 
Work-Life Study (BWLS) of over a thousand large employers209 
shows that only sixteen percent of those surveyed provided more than 
twelve weeks paternity leave while thirty-three percent provided 
more than twelve weeks maternity leave.210 In addition to length-of-
leave variations, large employers in this survey were likely to 
differentiate between mothers and fathers in the provision of paid 
leave. At least some replacement pay was made available by fifty-
three percent of respondents for maternity leave, but only thirteen 
percent made replacement pay available for paternity leave.211 
The impact on leave-taking has also been studied. According to 
the Commission’s 2000 survey, 16.5% of all workers took leave for 
an FMLA reason,212 a leave-taking rate very similar to 1995.213 An 
additional 3.5 million employees needed leave, but were unable to 
take it.214 The most common reason for not taking leave despite 
 206. For example, sixty-six percent of employers extended the period of leave available to 
employees, and fifty-three percent began offering continued health insurance through the leave 
period. See A WORKABLE BALANCE, supra note 200, at 66–67. 
 207. See id. at 119. 
 208. See FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE SURVEYS 2000, supra note 6, at 6-10. 
 209. See Families and Work Institute, 1998 Business Work-Life Study: Executive 
Summary I (1998), available at http://www.familiesandwork.org/summary/worklife.pdf. The 
survey examined employers with 100 or more employees, almost all of whom were covered by 
the FMLA. Id.  
 210. See id. at IV tbl.B. 
 211. See id. at IV tbl.C. 
 212. The 2000 survey defined “leave-taker” to include anyone who took leave for a reason 
covered by the FMLA, whether or not they were eligible or worked for a covered employer. See 
FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE SURVEYS 2000, supra note 6, at 2-1 to 2-2. 
 213. See id. at ix. 
 214. See id. at 2-13 to 2-14. If you count only employees in covered worksites, the number 
of leave-needers drops to 2.9 million, and counting only eligible employees in those worksites, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol15/iss1/3
p  7 Grossman book pages.doc  4/23/2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2004]  Job Security Without Equality 53 
 
 
 
needing it is the inability to afford it,215 and 87.8% of employees with 
unmet leave needs responded that they would have taken leave if at 
least some of it had been paid.216  
Leave-taking patterns reflect that most leave-takers use it only 
once during an eighteen-month period (75.2%),217 and very few take 
leave more than twice (10.2%).218 Most leaves are short—more than 
half were for ten days or fewer, and fewer than ten percent lasted 
more than eight weeks.219 
Parenting obligations triggered a relatively small percentage of 
total leave taken. Only 7.9% of leave-takers used the time for a 
pregnancy-related disability, 18.5% used it to care for a newborn, 
newly adopted, or newly placed foster child, and 11.5% used it to 
care for an ill child.220 In contrast, more than fifty percent of leaves 
were taken because of an employee’s own health.221 Maternity-
disability situations tended to produce the longest leaves, and one-
fourth of such leaves last longer than the twelve weeks allotted by the 
FMLA.222 
A majority of leave-takers are female, and employees between 
ages twenty-five and thirty-four use more than both younger and 
older employees.223 Leave-takers are also more likely to be married 
and have children in the household relative to both the general 
employee population and non-leave takers.224 
The statistics about leave-taking by gender show a predictable 
pattern. Of female employees with young children, 75.8% took at 
the number drops further to 2.4 million.  
 215. See id. at 2-16 (finding 77.6% of leave-needers listed “ability to afford” as one of the 
reasons for not taking leave). 
 216. See id. at 2-17. 
 217. See id. at 2-3. 
 218. See id.  
 219. See id. (reporting 9.2% of leave-takers used between forty-one and sixty days of leave, 
and 9.9% took a leave lasting sixty-one days or more). For employees who took more than one 
leave during the survey period, the shorter of the two was typically very short, between one and 
three days long in nearly forty-three percent of the cases. Fewer than ten percent of second 
leaves lasted more than twenty days. See id. at 2-4. 
 220. See id. at 2-5. 
 221. Id. 
 222. See id. at 2-7. 
 223. See id. at 2-8. 
 224. See id. 
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least one leave, and a negligible number said they needed but did not 
take leave.225 This is consistent with pre-FMLA data showing that 
women take leave to have children even if they do not have a 
guaranteed job to return to. Leave for women was split relatively 
evenly between “maternity-disability” and “new child care.”226 Of all 
female leave-takers, 13.6% took a maternity-disability leave and 
15.3% took a newborn care leave.227 Of all female employees, 5.7% 
took a leave for either maternity or newborn care.228 
In contrast, fewer than half of similarly situated male employees 
(45.1%) took any leave, and 3.8% reported needing leave but not 
taking it.229 As a percentage of all employees with young children, 
34.1% of men took leave to care for a newborn or newly adopted 
child, while 68.2% of women took leave either classified as 
maternity-disability or newborn care during the same period.230 
Twenty-two percent of male leave-takers took leave to care for a 
newborn or newly adopted child.231 Of all male employees, 3.1% 
took a leave for that purpose, slightly ore than half of the percentage 
of female employees taking such leave. 
These numbers, which appear to reflect relatively small gender 
differences, likely mask a greater disparity. The 1995 and 2000 
surveys have two significant gaps that make it difficult to assess the 
FMLA’s impact on paternal leave-taking. First, they fail to break 
down data on length of leave by gender.232 For example, the 2000 
survey reports that of FMLA leaves taken for newborn care, more 
than half lasted fewer than ten days.233 But the survey does not 
differentiate by length between the newborn caretaking leaves taken 
by men and women. Pre-FMLA data suggests that women tend to 
 225. See id. at 4-15 to 4-16. 
 226. Id. at 4-17. It is likely that the line between these two categories is imprecise because 
a woman taking leave for childbirth is likely to characterize her entire leave as maternity-
disability, though technically it should be reclassified as caretaking leave after six to eight 
weeks. 
 227. See id. at A-2-5. 
 228. See id. at A-2-14. 
 229. See id. at 4-15. 
 230. See id. at 4-17. 
 231. See id. at A-2-5. 
 232. The survey does break down the length of leave by the type of leave permitted by the 
FMLA. See id. at A-2-2. 
 233. See id. 
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take relatively long leaves234 while men take negligible ones.235 The 
FMLA Commission surveys do not show whether the FMLA has 
changed that pattern. What little data there is on post-FMLA paternal 
leaves suggests that they remain extremely short, a few days rather 
than a few weeks or months.236 
Second, the 2000 survey does not make clear how many women’s 
leaves begin with childbirth. It may be that the length of childbirth 
leaves (all longer than ten days, many longer than sixty days) 
indicates that some female-only parenting leave is being subsumed 
into that category, and thus the relatively equal number of male and 
female employees taking newborn care leave may be misleading.237 
While better data would certainly be helpful, there is nothing in 
the official reports or elsewhere to suggest that the FMLA has been 
transformative for paternal leave-taking,238 although it has caused a 
significant number of employers to formally allow men to take 
paternity leave. 
V. SOME LESSONS FROM ANTI-SUBORDINATION THEORY: A 
REFOCUSED VISION OF THE FMLA  
The FMLA was pushed as a complement to the protections 
already available to pregnant women and working parents. By the 
time the FMLA was enacted, more than thirty states had mandatory 
leave laws,239 and employees working for employers with at least 
 234. See supra text accompanying note 97. 
 235. See supra text accompanying note 100. See also Joseph H. Pleck, Are “Family-
Supportive” Employer Policies Relevant to Men, in MEN, WORK, AND FAMILY 226 (Jane C. 
Hood ed., 1993) (describing a 1984 study that included 119 companies offering paternity leave 
and found that of the nine companies reporting actual employee use of the policy, most show 
only one father taking leave). A 1990 recruiting firm study reported a one percent use of 
paternity leave. Pleck, supra. 
 236. See, e.g., Children’s Defense Fund—Minnesota, supra note 103, at 3 (reporting data 
on length of paternity leaves). 
 237. FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE SURVEYS 2000, supra note 6, at A-2-2. 
 238. See Rhode, supra note 81, at 841–42 (estimating fifteen percent of men to be paternity 
leave-takers); Selmi, supra note 102, at 756 (stating that “few men avail themselves of family 
leave”); see also Keith Cunningham, Note, Father Time: Flexible Work Arrangements and the 
Law Firm’s Failure of the Family, 967, 976 (2001) (blaming the lack of fathers taking paternity 
leave on the loss of income they suffer during leave). 
 239. These laws took a variety of forms. Some mandated leave only for pregnancy; others 
were more similar to the FMLA. For a discussion of the laws in existence immediately prior to 
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fifteen employees also had the protection of the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act.240  
After the Supreme Court’s 1987 decision in California Federal 
Savings & Loan Association v. Guerra, women had been granted 
formal equality for pregnancy-related disabilities. That is, employers 
could not treat them any worse than comparably disabled 
employees.241 The Court also held that employers could treat them 
better than comparably disabled employees.242 Guerra endorsed 
incremental progress: permitting employers (or states mandating 
leave) to accommodate motherhood even if they could not, or were 
not inclined to, accommodate other disabilities.243 It thus opened the 
door for a substantive equality approach to pregnancy by 
encouraging, though not requiring, employers to provide special 
accommodations for pregnancy. But even if all employers took up the 
Court’s offer, the PDA could offer nothing beyond the 
accommodation of “childbirth, or related medical conditions.”244 
Guerra made clear that accommodations must correspond to the 
actual period of disability.245 
Under the PDA, as interpreted by both the EEOC246 and the 
Supreme Court,247 employers are not allowed to provide parenting or 
caretaking leave unless they do so on gender-neutral terms.248 The 
disincentives for employers to voluntarily provide such broad-based 
leave are obvious. 
The gender-neutral FMLA should have improved upon the PDA’s 
groundwork with its mandate that at least minimal leave be offered. 
Immediately, it cures two limitations of the PDA for covered 
passage of the FMLA, see Ross, supra note 82, at 98–106. 
 240. See Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e(k) (2000)). 
 241. Katharine T. Bartlett, Gender Law, 1 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 2–3 (1994) 
(describing tenets of formal equality). 
 242. Guerra, 479 U.S. at 290–91. 
 243. See id. 
 244. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000). 
 245. See 479 U.S. at 290. 
 246. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (2003). 
 247. See Guerra, 479 U.S. at 290. 
 248. Providing different length parenting leave to men and women, unrelated to childbirth, 
would clearly violate Title VII’s ban on sex-based employment practices.  
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employees.249 First, it deprives covered employers of the right to 
provide no leave for disability related to pregnancy or childbirth. This 
forced accommodation of motherhood provides job security to 
women who may have lacked it under their employers’ policies. 
Second, it mandates that employers provide parenting leave 
regardless of whether the employee suffers a related disability. For 
biological mothers, the FMLA guarantees four to six weeks of leave 
in addition to the usual period of childbirth-related disability.250 For 
adoptive mothers and both biological and adoptive fathers, the Act 
mandates the availability of the same total amount of leave, even 
without the underlying disability—twelve weeks for a newly born or 
newly adopted child.251 The Act thus forces some accommodation of 
parenthood, too, and provides job security for those who elect to take 
advantage of it. 
However, these cures are not enough, and a brief discussion of 
theories of equality reveals why. The FMLA combines principles of 
formal and substantive equality. It serves principles of formal 
equality, which mandates equal treatment for equals,252 by providing 
men and women the opportunity to take caregiving leave on equal 
terms. There is no biological reason why parenting—a distinct 
function from giving birth—ought to be predominantly performed by 
mothers,253 and thus no justifiable basis exists for employers to 
provide parenting leave to mothers and fathers on unequal terms. 
Insisting on formal equality with respect to caretaking leave is an 
extension of conventional liberal theory, which emphasizes “the 
similarities between men and women and the desirability of same-
treatment solutions to legal problems.”254 This theory of equality 
reflects the desire to have “both women and men be free to make 
 249. The PDA was technically an amendment to Title VII and thus applies to any employer 
subject to Title VII—those with at least fifteen employees. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000). 
The FMLA applies to much larger employers. See supra note 8. 
 250. See supra notes 6, 88. 
 251. This holds true except when married couples work for the same employer. In those 
cases, the twelve weeks must be shared between the spouses. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(f) (2000). 
Because the biological mother will need six to eight weeks of leave for maternity disability, she 
will use up most, if not all, of that allotment herself. 
 252. See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 241, at 2–3. 
 253. See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text. 
 254. Bartlett, supra note 241, at 2. 
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their own choices, unconstrained by artificial barriers and 
prohibitions.”255 
The FMLA also embraces a substantive theory of equality—one 
that focuses on equal opportunity or outcomes—by imposing a 
minimum standard of leave. This ensures that women covered by the 
Act are given the same opportunity to reproduce and return to the 
same job, a perk most men already enjoy.256  
Despite this focus, governmentally-imposed obstacles comprise 
only part of the story, and being able to have a baby without being 
fired is only part of the bundle of rights men have always enjoyed. 
Leave-taking data both before and after the FMLA was enacted 
shows that even after removal of the state barriers to equality 
obstacles and even after imposition of statutory guarantees of job 
security, inequality persists. Women continue to assume 
disproportionate responsibilities with respect to family caregiving 
and employers continue to prefer men as employees.  
Gender neutrality does not guarantee equality. Although the 
mandate of gender-neutral leave does not explicitly reinforce 
stereotypes that only women do or should take leave to fulfill 
caregiving obligations, the FMLA does nothing to change those 
beliefs or the caretaking and leave-taking patterns that flow from 
them. The gender neutrality of the FMLA becomes simply a 
constitutional shield, to ward off attacks like the one launched, 
ultimately unsuccessfully, in Hibbs.  
Under modern equal protection principles, Congress could not 
constitutionally mandate parenting leave—as distinguished from 
pregnancy or childbirth leave—only for women.257 To the extent 
employers provide leave for a childbirth-related disability, men, as a 
class, have no claim to the same right under conventional principles 
 255.  Id. 
 256. See Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, 1 BERKELEY 
WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 22–31 (1985) (arguing that pregnant women should be assured “equality of 
opportunity to the same extent as that available to males who have engaged in reproductive 
conduct”); see also Linda Krieger & Patricia Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal 
Treatment, Positive Action and the Meaning of Women’s Equality, 13 GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 
513, 542 (1983) (urging courts to focus on “the effect of the very real sex difference of 
pregnancy on the relative positions of men and women in society and on the goal of assuring 
equality of opportunity and effect within a heterogeneous ‘society of equals’”). 
 257. See supra text accompanying notes 43–48. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol15/iss1/3
p  7 Grossman book pages.doc  4/23/2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2004]  Job Security Without Equality 59 
 
 
 
of formal equality.258 But to the extent available leave exceeds the 
usual or actual period of disability associated with pregnancy or 
childbirth, it constitutes parenting leave, to which men do have an 
equal right. The Court’s opinion in Guerra, as well as other Title VII 
cases, make this abundantly clear. Thus, if an employer provides 
parenting leave to women, it must also provide it to men.  
Likewise, if the government mandates the provision of parenting 
or caretaking leave to women, it must mandate identical leave for 
men. But the constitutionality of a mandated leave law turns on its 
actual provisions, not the leave-taking patterns of private parties it 
induces. Congress’s statements of purpose are consistent with Equal 
Protection Principles,259 and certainly do not reflect the kind of 
invidious purpose necessary to invalidate a gender-neutral law.260  
Gender neutrality was also important to the FMLA’s survival of 
the Eleventh Amendment challenge in Hibbs.261 In Hibbs, the Court 
embraced the Statute as an appropriate federally mandated remedy 
for a history of state-sponsored discrimination against women that 
both hindered their efforts to be workers and promoted their 
tendencies as primary caretakers.262 And yet the law, as actually 
utilized, does nothing of the sort. 
The Supreme Court’s attribution of this vision to the FMLA is a 
prime example of why constitutional gender equality and true 
equality are not necessarily the same thing. In the Court’s 
understanding, the long history of state-sponsored discrimination 
against women in employment was the obstacle to both workplace 
and parenting equality.263 It thus lauded Congress’s attempt not only 
 258. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). 
 259. See 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(5) (2000) (stating a purpose of the Act: “to promote the goal 
of equal employment opportunity for women and men, pursuant to [the Equal Protection 
C]lause”); § 2601(b)(4) (2000) (stating another purpose: “to accomplish [the Act’s other 
purposes] in a manner that, consistent with the Equal Protection Clause . . . , minimizes the 
potential for employment discrimination on the basis of sex”). 
 260. A gender-neutral law can be challenged using equal protection principles if it has the 
purpose and effect of discriminating on the basis of sex. See Pers. Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney, 
442 U.S. 256, 276–78 (1979). One would be hard pressed to prove that the FMLA was enacted 
in order to ensure that men do not take leave, even though it failed to take account of the data 
showing most of them would not. 
 261. See supra text accompanying notes 72–75. 
 262. See Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1979. 
 263. See id. at 1979 n.5. 
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to remove those obstacles, but also to compensate for the damages 
they had caused. Applying a classic liberal approach to equality, the 
Court envisioned a world in which equal leave availability would 
translate to equal leave taking, equal parenting, and equal valuation 
of male and female workers.264 Yet all available data before Congress 
suggested this would not happen. Men, then and now, rarely take 
leave from work in order to care for children or other family 
members.265 
Consider a less conventional approach to equality: anti-
subordination theory. This theory of equality advocated most strongly 
by Catharine MacKinnon,266 may be useful in understanding the 
limitations of the FMLA from the perspective of inequality. She 
criticizes more conventional approaches to equality for leaving out 
“the social institutionalization of practices through which women are 
violated, abused, exploited, and patronized by men socially—in 
collaboration with the state, but not only or even primarily by the 
state as such.”267 It is these practices—overlooked by “main line” 
theories of equality that foster inequality and perpetuate the 
subordination of women. Unshared parenting—and the laws that 
allow or even encourage it to persist—must be put to the anti-
subordination test.  
Reevaluated with anti-subordination principles in mind, the 
FMLA’s limitations become obvious. As argued by Susan Deller 
Ross before its enactment, the FMLA does: 
[S]et the stage for a more complete integration of fathers at 
home by allowing them substantial time off to care for [ill 
family members] as well as for newborns. And by giving 
fathers the right to do so, it takes pressure off mothers to be 
 264. See id. at 1982–83. 
 265. They do, it turns out, take a lot of sick leave: Of men who took FMLA leave for some 
purpose, 57.6% of them took it because of their own serious illness rather than for caregiving 
purposes. See FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE SURVEYS 2000, supra note 6, at A-2-5. The 
comparable statistic for women is 48.6%, which does not include leave classified as maternity-
disability. See id. 
 266. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987) (articulating anti-
subordination theory); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 
YALE L.J. 1281 (1991); see also Catherine A. MacKinnon, Unthinking ERA Thinking, 54 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 759 (1987) (reviewing JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA (1986)). 
 267. MacKinnon, Unthinking ERA Thinking, supra note 266, at 765. 
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Super Mom and do all these tasks, thus setting the stage for 
women to be more completely integrated into the workforce.268 
The FMLA sets the stage but does not induce the actors to actually 
perform. To the contrary, the Act was passed despite a virtual 
certainty that it would not have any significant effect on paternal 
leave-taking. 
The subordinating practice is the intersection of unshared 
parenting and employment discrimination that occurs because of it. 
The FMLA fails to combat this subordination, and indeed masks its 
existence with the veil of neutrality. A better FMLA would want 
more than to provide job security for women as they continued not 
only to give birth to children (a biological imperative) but also to 
provide primary care. It would have as a goal the forced 
accommodation of motherhood and the simultaneous elimination of 
the incentives employers have to discriminate against female 
employees. Providing fathers with the formal opportunity to take 
parenting leave—in a society in which social, cultural, and economic 
forces make it unlikely he will do so—is not enough. 
A law consistent with the anti-subordination approach to equality 
would understand that it is not enough to mandate equal provision of 
leave: Men must be affirmatively pressed into service. At a 
minimum, the law should make paternity leave more enticing. There 
has been some effort by employers to provide paid leaves to both 
mothers and fathers. A FWI study reports that thirteen percent of 
companies with at least 100 employees provide some paid leave for 
new fathers.269 Paid leave programs seem to be used at a much 
greater rate than unpaid ones. One large firm reports that as many as 
fifty percent of new fathers employed there take advantage of paid 
paternity leave.270 Other researchers have noted a “long-term 
trend . . . toward more firms offering paid paternity leave—and more 
workers taking advantage of it.”271 
 268. Ross, supra note 82, at 104. 
 269. See Lewis, supra note 107, at 1 (describing the study and noting a “general societal 
shift” toward men wanting involvement with their newborn children). 
 270. See id. (describing the paternity leave policy and leave-taking patterns at KPMG, 
LLP). 
 271. Kane, supra note 105 (quoting James Levine, director of New York’s Fatherhood 
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But, as with all problems of culturally entrenched difference, 
individual incentives cannot solve the problem. Institutional culture is 
central to the reluctance of male employees to avail themselves of 
offered leave, and culture in a broader sense is central to their lack of 
desire to participate in childrearing. The FMLA might attack the 
problem of institutional culture first by giving organizations 
incentives, as Professor Michael Selmi has suggested, for 
successfully encouraging men to take parental leaves.272 Without any 
inducement for equal parenthood, the FMLA’s contribution to sex 
equality is necessarily constrained. 
CONCLUSION 
That the FMLA does not seem to have the effect of inducing 
paternal leave-taking does not, of course, mean that Hibbs was 
wrongly decided or that the Act is an unconstitutional attempt to 
abrogate state sovereign immunity. It simply means Congress did not 
go far enough. Within constitutional limits, it could have acted—or 
could now act—to remedy the same problem, the documentation of 
which now has the Supreme Court’s stamp of approval as a bona fide 
history of unconstitutional sex discrimination. Congress now has 
license to redouble its efforts to fulfill the Court’s vision of equality. 
The lesson from Hibbs is that Congress can prohibit constitutional 
conduct to prevent and deter unconstitutional conduct. Requiring 
employers to offer unpaid leave responded to a state-sponsored 
history of discrimination—maybe too congruently and too 
proportionally. Congress could have cut a broader swath around the 
unconstitutional core in order to make a meaningful dent in the 
ongoing patterns of discrimination against mothers who work.  
Requiring paid leave is one obvious solution that would 
undoubtedly have a non-negligible impact on paternal leave-taking. If 
leave is paid, many of the disincentives for men disappear. Other, 
more creative solutions may have to be considered as well. But 
Project at the Families and Work Institute). 
 272. See Selmi, supra note 102, at 775–76. He has also suggested forcing new fathers to 
take leave—involuntarily if necessary, though he recognizes the political obstacles to such a 
proposal. Id. at 773–75. 
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Congress’s concern with motherhood—despite the veil of 
neutrality—inhibited meaningful attention to the issue of equality for 
working mothers. So for now, women protected by the FMLA have 
gained job security without equality. 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
